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THE FRAMING EFFECTS OF PROFESSIONALISM: IS
THERE A LAWYER CAST OF MIND? LESSONS FROM
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS

Robert Eli Rosen,* Christine E. Parker,** & Vibeke Lehmann
Nielsen*** †
ABSTRACT
Professionals working inside companies may bring with them
frames of mind set by their professional experience and socialization.
Lawyers, in particular, are said to “think like a lawyer”—to have a
lawyer cast of mind. In seeking power within a company and in
exercising the power that they obtain, professionals may draw on
their professional background to frame, name, diagnose, and
prescribe a remedy for the company’s problems. In making decisions
about their compliance with the law, companies are constrained not
only by their environment, but also by their agents’ understanding of
whose (or what) interests the company should serve. In particular,
compliance managers’ understandings will frame and influence their
companies’ calculations of the value, benefits, and costs of
compliance activities. The profession of the compliance manager
then may influence how the company complies with the law. This
Article uses data from a survey of 999 large Australian businesses to
examine the professional background of the person in charge of
compliance and (1) how they analyze the costs, benefits and risks of
non-compliance; and (2) their company’s structures and practices of
compliance.
Contrary to our hypotheses, we find that the
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professional background of the individual responsible for compliance
has little impact on a company’s compliance management structures
and practices or assessment of stakeholders. The exceptions are that
having a lawyer in charge of compliance is associated with the
company’s perception of heightened legal risk; and where the person
in charge of compliance is a lawyer, the company compliance efforts
will be marked by manuals and training programs, but not more
fulsome compliance structures, which are present when a compliance
specialist leads the department. Unfortunately, our data also reveals
that these compliance structures are generally merely formal—and
likely largely symbolic.
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The mind of the lawyer is the essential part of the machinery of
justice . . . . The progress of the law means the progress of the
lawyer, not of a few talented men who are on the outposts of legal
thought, but the great army of the commonplace . . . .1

INTRODUCTION
An inveterate tradition in thinking about the legal profession is to
ascribe to lawyers a “cast of mind.”2 “Thinking like a lawyer”
supposedly names a peculiar mode of both analysis and response.3
The “great army” of lawyers is said to have “[t]he mind of the
lawyer.”4
Experience, socialization, and education in particular, are thought
to construct the lawyer cast of mind.5 By performing law jobs, such as
1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 317–18 (1916)
(quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, Report of the Committee on Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar, in REPORT OF THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 365 (1897)).
2. David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 717, 718–19 (1988) (discussing de Tocqueville). The use of “mind” is
definitely not intended to exclude emotions or psychological characteristics.
Tocqueville was discussing “mores,” sometimes translated as “habits of the heart.”
ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 36-41 (1996); see also Luban, supra, at 721
(discussing Brandeis).
3. The concept of “thinking like a lawyer,” like that of a lawyerly cast of mind, is
a capacious one. We do not believe that there is a single definition of either of these
concepts. Like “profession” itself, they are “folk concepts.” See ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY & POLICY 20 (1994). The status of
“thinking like a lawyer” as a folk concept is testified to by the number of quite
different books with this exact phrase in their title. See, e.g., PATRICK M. MCFADDEN,
A STUDENT’S GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS: THINKING LIKE A LAWYER (2001);
ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOLS: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A
LAWYER” (2007); SARAH E. REDFIELD, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN EDUCATOR’S
GUIDE TO LEGAL ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH (2011); FRED SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE
A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2009); THINKING LIKE A
LAWYER: ESSAYS ON LEGAL HISTORY AND GENERAL HISTORY FOR JOHN CROOK ON
HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY (J.A. Crook & Paul McKechnie eds., 2002); KENNETH J.
VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
(1996). These are only some of the most recent examples available in print.
4. COHEN, supra note 1, at 317.
5. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (2004). On the experience of
Australian law schools and their connection with the hierarchy of the legal
profession, see Christine Parker & Andrew Goldsmith, ‘Failed Sociologists’ in the
Marketplace: Law Schools in Australia, 25 J.L. SOC’Y 33 (1998), simultaneously
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drafting documents or appearing before tribunals, lawyers may
develop habits of heart and mind. Some of these are characteristic of
all fiduciaries, such as careful work, anticipation of risks, and
unselfish devotion.6 Others are characteristic of the legal profession,
such as unquestioning loyalty, partisanship, and the ability to
challenge authority with respect.7 Yet others may be less ennobling,
such as being adversarial, critical, closed, mono-disciplinary,
aggressive, or arrogantly independent.8 There may be arguments
about what character traits are taught, or how to teach them—
especially given divergent moral and political values—but there is
little controversy that legal practice and education develop “thinking
like a lawyer.”
The framing effects of “thinking like a lawyer” may be understood
as an instance of the more general framing effects of professionalism.
Professional role and background as consequential for behavior has
been argued for by Berle & Means,9 Neil Fligstein,10 Herbert Simon,11
Amos Tversky,12 and many others.13
Their work suggests that professional framing operates even
outside what may be seen as the profession’s “jurisdiction.”14
Lawyers, for example, may prefer acquisitive, rather than internal
diversification, strategies when they become CEOs.15 Or, they may
spend less on Research and Development (R&D) than CEOs with

published in TRANSFORMATIVE VISIONS OF LEGAL EDUCATION 33 (Anthony
Bradney & Fiona Cownie eds., 1998). See also MARGARET THORNTON, PRIVATISING
THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITY: THE CASE OF LAW (2012).
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01, 8.08 (2006).
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 3.4, 8.4 (2012).
8. Michele DeStefano suggested we prominently include these characteristics as
well as the more virtuous ones. We thank her.
9. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 54–55 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
14. To adopt Andrew Abbott’s term for the field of a particular profession’s
analysis and action, see ANDREW ABBOTT, SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON
THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 53–57 (1988).
15. Jae H. Song, Diversification Strategies and the Experience of Top Executives
of Large Firms, 3 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 377 (1982) (internal diversification was
favored by CEOs with marketing background; acquisitive diversification was favored
by CEOs with backgrounds in finance, accounting, and law).
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other backgrounds.16 Social fields, like the economy or the family, are
sometimes “legalized,” which occurs when legal professionals reorder
aspects of a social field by successfully applying legal forms, concepts,
and imaginings outside a traditional legal arena (normally thereby
creating jobs for the legally trained).17 Legalization, however, is
(fortunately) not always successful: The power of thinking like a
lawyer may or may not support lawyers as they move into jobs
outside what has heretofore been considered “legal.” Or, only
aspects of thinking like a lawyer may travel with the lawyer.
This Article inquires into the framing effects of professionalism on
organizational compliance structures and practices, with particular
attention to the distinctive influence, if any, of the lawyer cast of
mind.
We ask: When lawyers are compliance managers, do
companies’ structures and practices of compliance differ from when a
chief financial officer or specialized compliance professional,
company secretary, or chief executive officer is the manager of
compliance? We use survey data to measure the framing effects of
professionalism and the distinctiveness of the lawyer cast of mind on
compliance structures and practices.
Self-introspective writing on “the lawyer cast of mind” and
“thinking like a lawyer” is vast. This Article appears in a special issue
of the Fordham Urban Law Journal inspired by the work of Julius
Henry Cohen. Part One of the Article uses his work to discuss the
lawyer cast of mind. Part Two of the Article provides a brief
literature review about the influence on business behavior of the
professional background of managers.
In Part Three, we develop and present a theoretical model for
research. We then test this model using our data from 999 large
Australian businesses. Our data includes many lawyers and other
professionals who manage their organizations’ compliance structures
and practices. Contrary to our hypotheses, we find that the
professional background of the individual responsible for compliance
has little impact on a company’s compliance management structures
and practices or assessment of compliance risks. The exceptions are
that having a lawyer in charge of compliance is associated with the

16. Vincent L. Barker, III & George C. Mueller, CEO Characteristics and Firm
R&D Spending, 48 MGMT. SCI. 782, 797 (2002) (“CEOs with legal career experience
spend less on R&D than CEOs without such experience.”)
17. See, e.g., FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY POLICY IN THE NEW EUROPE (Jacek
Kurczewski & Mavis Maclean eds., 1997); THE IMPOSITION OF LAW (Sandra B.
Burman & Barbara E. Harrell-Bond eds., 1979).
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company’s perception of heightened legal risk; and where the person
in charge of compliance is a lawyer, the company compliance efforts
will be marked by manuals and training programs, but not more
fulsome compliance structures, which are present when the
department is headed by a compliance specialist. After presenting
our data, we consider its significance and limitations.
Currently, there is a contest among professions about jurisdiction
over compliance systems18: Who should lead them? In the United
States, we are seeing Chief Compliance Officer positions emerge,
often out of and separating from the legal department.19 For some,
this divorce is a happy event, as the role of “cop” is removed from the
legal department.20 For others, this is a reduction in the lawyer role
and they seek to resist it. Our research took place in Australia at a
time when there was no consensus as to who should be in charge of
the compliance systems that we examined. This makes our study an
excellent one for seeing whether and how the lawyer cast of mind is
put in play compared with other professional frames.
It is not only students of the professions who can benefit from a
better understanding of the role of professionals in compliance
programs. There is a great deal of policy and research interest in how
companies respond to the threat of external regulation and regulatory
enforcement by putting in place internal controls (compliance
systems).21 The development of company compliance and risk
management structures has been the focus of legislative, judicial, and
private regulatory initiatives.22 In the United States, the presumed

18. “To an outside observer there is a strong scent of professional competition”
between lawyers and non-lawyers as to who should be the “chief ethics and
compliance officers.” Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-house
Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 500 (2012);
see also ROBERT ELI ROSEN, LAWYERS IN CORPORATE DECISION-MAKING 103 (Quid
Pro Books 2010) (1984); Christine Parker, The Ethics of Advising on Regulatory
Compliance: Autonomy or Interdependence?, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 339 (2000); Robert
Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance: The Diffusion of
QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251 (2005) [hereinafter Rosen, Diffusion] (lawyers
and board in competition).
19. Michele DeStefano, The Government’s Unofficial Stance on Compliance
Departments: To Comply or Not to Comply (draft on file with authors).
20. Robert Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 457, 463–64 (2000) (describing inside counsel as playing a “cop” role).
21. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22. See THE UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION (Radu Mares ed., 2011); Cary Coglianese &
David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to
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ability of the chief compliance officer to direct corporate behavior is
the basis for individual liability23 and for the strategy of the
regulator.24
Providing corporate leadership opportunities to professionals has
been a mechanism that some have hoped would make corporations
more responsible.25 Their professional skills would make them better
sensors of environmental influences and their professional
commitments would make them lead the corporation to valuing
compliance.26 Either their socialization or their career interests would
lead them to be carriers of professional norms inside the
corporation.27 As employees, they would make the corporation more
permeable to regulation.28 In the conclusion, we return to this hope.
I. JULIUS H ENRY COHEN AND THE LAWYER CAST OF MIND
Understood functionally, the lawyer cast of mind has various
aspects. First, it is normative control: it constructs what is virtue and
vice for a lawyer. Second, it creates identity: it unites and separates
lawyers. Third, it forges jurisdictions: it maintains, gains, and declines
work for the profession. And fourth, it establishes traditions: it
speaks one set of public discourses and silences others.29
Although there are traditions in which being “like a lawyer” is
condemned and there are those which mark lawyers as the butts of
jokes, there also is a tradition that equates the lawyer cast of mind
with virtuous action. Julius Henry Cohen is in that tradition. For
Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691 (2003); Lawrence A. Cunningham,
The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29
IOWA J. CORP. L. 267, 277–82 (2004); Sharon Gilad, It Runs in the Family: MetaRegulation and Its Siblings, 4 REG. & GOVERNANCE 485 (2010).
23. See Anthony Pirraglia, Note, Tangled Web: Compliance Director Liability
Under the Securities Laws, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 245, 268 (2003).
24. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377,
464 (2006) (quoting SEC official).
25. See CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELFREGULATION AND DEMOCRACY 168–96 (2002).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Maureen Cain, The Symbol Traders, in LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN
WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 15 (Maureen Cain & Christine
Harrington eds., 1994); Timothy Kuhn, Positioning Lawyers: Discursive Resources,
Professional Ethics and Identification, 16 ORGANIZATION 681 (2009); Christine
Parker & Tanina Rostain, Law Firms, Global Capital, and the Sociological
Imagination, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2347 (2012).
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Cohen, the cause and consequence of becoming a lawyer is the lawyer
cast of mind, which frames a lawyer’s motives and actions and aligns
them with ethics. In Cohen’s day, admitting immigrants (often Jewish
and Catholic) to the legal profession was at issue. Cohen supported
the admission of immigrants to the profession on the ground that
legal education socialized them into thinking like an “American” (i.e.,
non-immigrant) lawyer: “[T]he passage through the universities and
the law schools . . . shows clearly that these obstacles [of poor
socialization] are overcome . . . .”30
To Cohen, a lawyer’s identity—that lawyer’s cast of mind—is an
acquired virtue, and consequently the profession of law can be
accessed by all. The existence of a virtuous lawyer cast of mind
enabled Julius Henry Cohen to implicate democratic values into the
profession: Immigrants could become lawyers and they could join
with non-immigrants to be forces for justice because they learned to
think (and consequently feel) alike.31 However, because it is an
acquired virtue, guardians of the profession are needed and they must
be eternally vigilant to preserve the lawyer cast of mind since what
can be acquired can also be lost or misshapen.32 Julius Henry Cohen
was one of those guardians.
A contrary view is that virtue and good character are traits that are
developed outside of legal training33: Who one is, not the lawyer cast
of mind one has been educated into, informs ethical choices in legal
practice. And passing tests on professionalism bears little relation to
behavior in practice.34 Legal practice then needs to be limited to good
men.35 Character and fitness committees should be emboldened to
guard against miscreants entering the profession. The weakness of
this view stems from the legendary difficulties of assessing good

30. Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the
Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth
Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 15 (2005) (quoting COHEN,
supra note 1, at 317). Hence, “Cohen identified higher standards of admission to the
bar as one of the central aspects of his vision of law as a profession . . . .” Levine,
supra, at 7 n.32.
31. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
32. See Levine, supra note 30, at 22.
33. See generally id.
34. See id. at 22 nn.31–32.
35. And women need not apply. For a survey of the historical record, see
generally CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1993); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein,

Women in the Legal Profession at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: Assessing
Glass Ceilings and Open Doors, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 733 (2001) (detailing barriers to
the entry of women into the legal profession).
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character. Secondary judgments substitute for primary ones: class,
race, national origin and ethnic background are taken to indicate
character. Democratic admission policies are then understood to
threaten professionalism.36 Cohen’s response is that this threat can be
met by the lawyer cast of mind and protecting it by vigilantly
imposing strictures on how lawyers behave, maintaining the
“dignity”37 of the lawyer office, disciplining wayward lawyers, and
regulating law schools.38
The lawyer cast of mind to Cohen does not only support diversity
in membership in the legal profession, but also makes possible
common cause between lawyers.39 Despite the sociological reality
that lawyers on Wall Street, on Main Street, and on Tally’s Corner
have little in common except a professional degree, the conception of
thinking like a lawyer creates a common bond between them. It is
noteworthy, despite its usage being much more common in his day
than in ours, that Cohen repeatedly speaks to “we” lawyers.40 He
addresses his fellow American lawyers, telling them what “we know”
and that the lawyers’ fellow citizens “call upon us to discipline, to
educate.”41 Speaking to “we” is an assertion of power and it
challenges “we” to exercise power.42 Now that U.S. lawyers are more
than a million strong, Cohen’s vision of speaking to “we” lawyers
invites speculation about political mobilizations “of the great army”

36. See Levine, supra note 30, at 7.
37. See id. at 28 (quoting COHEN, supra note 1, at 313).
38. See id. at 22.
39. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 318.
40. See Levine, supra note 30, at 22 (quoting COHEN, supra note 1, at 258-59). As
Levine makes clear, Cohen uses “we” not to exclude others or to affirm a social
position—Cohen espouses neither nativist nor Christian superiority—but he uses
“we” to include himself and all lawyers and to deny the particularities of his social
position. See id. at 13.
41. See id. at 22; see also COHEN, supra note 1, at xiv (“We lawyers must be
reminded over and over again that we are living in a democracy.”). Cohen makes use
of the “Royal We,” instead of an “I” at many points in the book. See, e.g., id. at 1–2.
But, he also uses it to create identity between himself and the reader. For example,
the first line of the chapter on “Officer of the Court” is “We are an insular people at
best.” Id. at 44. Cohen concludes his argument with, “We begin now to understand . .
. the Russian immigrant.” Id. at 74. Or, “We have had, it is true, individual lawyers of
great distinction. . . . Hamilton, Jay, Marshall, Jefferson.” Id. at 104.
42. The right to say “we” is the central theme of Rubashov’s questioning in
Arthur Koestler’s DARKNESS AT NOON. See ARTHUR KOESTLER, DARKNESS AT
NOON 78–94 (1941).

ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

306

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

4/15/2013 5:48 PM

[Vol. XL

not yet taken.43 To Cohen “we” lawyers emerges, with their national
responsibilities and possibilities, because all lawyers have a certain
cast of mind. That is, Cohen was making an empirical assertion that
lawyers share a political vision because they share a cast of mind.
The lawyer cast of mind also allows the profession to occupy
“jurisdictions.” It is not just individual lawyers who find work outside
the traditional professional preserve, but new tasks and jobs become
allocated to lawyers as a result of collective mobilization projects,
including the organized bar fighting other occupations for jurisdiction
over work.44 The division of labor between professions, in part, is a
form of “intentional social architecture” based on claims of
knowledge to solve problems.45
“Thinking like a lawyer” is
sufficiently abstract that it allows the legal profession to “redefine its
problems and tasks, defend them from interlopers, and seize new
problems.”46 It is sufficiently concrete that it also enables remedies to
these problems and tasks.
In fighting against multi-disciplinary practices (MDPs), the ABA is
engaged in patrolling the borders of the legal profession’s jurisdiction.
Recent fighting is based on the effects such practices would have on
“thinking like a lawyer.”47 In other places, there has been more of a
blurring of professional boundaries and less call for a monopoly
defined by the lawyer cast of mind. In the United States, some
corporate work has been outsourced to non-lawyers.48 In the United
Kingdom, the conveyancing monopoly is a thing of the past. In the
United Kingdom and Australia, non-lawyers are allowed to own stock

43. COHEN, supra note 1, at 318. In questioning the singular nature of the legal
profession and its cast of mind, we question the vision of an army of lawyers capable
of being mobilized for this or that end.
44. See ABBOTT, supra note 14, at 86–91. For applications of this concept to the
legal profession, see generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN
VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996) and RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL
UNCERTAINTY (1995).
45. See DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER, POWER AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR 19
(1986).
46. See ABBOTT, supra note 14, at 9.
47. See Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of
Purchasing Legal Services From Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2000); Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the

Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on
the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (2000).
48. See, e.g., Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and
Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2137, 2164 (2010).
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in law firms, despite claims about the ill-effects on the lawyer cast of
mind.49 Today, as a matter of professional defense, as well as to
secure new tasks, such as compliance, mere recitals about a vague
lawyer cast of mind are insufficient.
There is not much empirical work on whether or not there is a
lawyer cast of mind. It has been more or less assumed that there is
one and the debate is only about its valences. Not all agree with
Cohen about its link to virtue. Some suggest, e.g., that lawyers are
overly aggressive.50 Nor do all agree that it is the distinctive voice of
the legal profession. Nor do all agree with its attempted silencing of
other traditions and approaches within the profession’s claimed
jurisdictions.
In the next Part, we survey relevant research on how the
professional backgrounds of managers and executives shape company
behavior. The findings of that literature point in multiple directions,
raising questions about whether legal education and practice actually
create a cast of mind, or at least whether it creates a cast of mind that
travels with lawyers to business. Our research reveals what aspects of
the lawyer cast of mind survive when lawyer jurisdiction is extended
into compliance programs.
II. PROFESSIONAL FRAMES’ INFLUENCE ON BUSINESS
BEHAVIORS
Researchers have studied the effects of many demographic
variables on the behavior of corporate actors, but professional or
functional background “is the most widely cited demographic
characteristic thought to affect corporate strategy.”51 That managers
would bring their professional attitudes and values to their work was
recognized by Berle and Means who argued that the separation of
49. See Andrew Boon, Professionalism Under the Legal Services Act 2007, 17
INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 195–232 (2010); John Flood, The Re-Landscaping of the Legal
Profession: Large Law Firms and Professional Re-Regulation, 59 CURRENT SOC.
507–29 (2011); Christine Parker, An Opportunity for the Ethical Maturation of the
Law Firm: The Ethical Implications of Incorporated and Listed Law Firms, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS 96–108 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 2010); Christine
Parker, Tahlia Gordon & Steve Mark, Regulating Law Firm Ethical Infrastructure:

An Empirical Assessment of the Potential for Management-Based Regulation of
Legal Practices, 37 J.L. & SOC’Y 466, 467 (2010).
50. See, e.g., Rand Jack & Dana Crowley Jack, Women Lawyers: Archetype and
Alternatives, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 933, 937–39 (1989).
51. Michael Jensen & Edward J. Zajac, Corporate Elites and Corporate Strategy:
How Demographic Preferences and Structural Position Shape the Scope of the Firm,
25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 507, 509 (2004).

ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

308

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

4/15/2013 5:48 PM

[Vol. XL

ownership and control allowed managers to pursue “prestige, power,
or the gratification of professional zeal.”52 More recently, Neil
Fligstein thought it self-evident that “having spent careers analyzing
business problems in a certain way, managers come to view all
problems through a certain theoretical lens.”53
In a 1958 article, Herbert A. Simon found that a manager’s current
job led him to perceive and interpret information differently from
those holding other jobs.54 He argued that functional background
leads to selective perception and consequently particular diagnoses
and remedies.55 In a 1991 article, Amos Tversky found that attitudes
toward risk vary by expertise regarding the context of a decision.56
Others have suggested that socialization and practice shape behavior
because they forge subcultures57 and identities.58 Others argue that
professional and functional backgrounds change people’s values and
that professional framing is normatively consequential, not merely
perceptual.59
52. Adolf Berle & Gardner C. Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 122 (1932) (emphasis added).
53. NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL 357 (1990)
(not citing any data).
54. Dewitt C. Dearborn & Herbert A. Simon, Selective Perception: A Note on
the Department Identifications of Executives, 21 SOCIOMETRY 140 (1958).
55. Id. at 141–43 (citing that a functional background leads general managers to
perceive and interpret information to reinforce their functional orientation). As
Gunz and Jalland point out, some authors have ignored that Dearborn and Simon do
not describe functional background, rather “the independent variable was the
manager’s current job and not his or her previous work history.” Hugh P. Gunz & R.
Michael Jalland, Managerial Careers and Business Strategies, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
718, 734 (1996). Our data is similar to Dearborn and Simon’s. We both infer
background from current jobs. In our case, except for compliance experts, it is the
job they hold in addition to being the compliance manager.
56. See Chip Heath & Amos Tversky, Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and
Competence in Choice Under Uncertainty, 4 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1991).
57. On predicting behavior from membership in a “subculture,” see George A.
Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, 90
Q.J. ECON. 599 (1976) and George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and
Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715 (2000) (cited in Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1459, 1510 (2005)).
58. Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms and Its
Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 606 (2004) (elaborating relations of norms and
identity).
59. Barker & Mueller, supra note 16. Barker and Mueller argue that it is not that
functional background creates biased perceptions which in turn explains performance
differences but that functional background generates “different value preferences. . . .
Therefore, CEOs with technical or marketing career experience may believe that
spending money on R&D is just the ‘right thing to do . . . .’” Id. at 797. Tyler &
Steensma argued that technical careers and educations teach people to personally
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According to such research, by framing the decision, professional
backgrounds define what is relevant, provide technologies of thought
and socialize normative vision. Perceiving that they have relevant
expertise, professionals also perceive reduced ambiguity and
uncertainty in confronting issue identification, information search and
processing, risk management, and remedy prescription.60 They suffer
from Veblen’s “trained incapacities.”61 Today, Veblen’s argument
would be cast in the tones of cognitive psychology, which famously
describes decision-makers as myopic and egocentric, attuned to their
own payoffs, discounting others’ perspectives62: one could
characterize such an individual as “the selfish professional.” This
emphasis on incapacity, it is worth noting, does not legitimize a
professional’s authority. It also does not help a profession win a
battle for jurisdiction to solve particular problems.
Another line of research has abstracted from individual professions
and grouped them by functions for the company, describing mind-sets
based on either “output” or “throughput” experiences.63
By
value innovation. See Beverley B. Tyler & H. Kevin Steensma, The Effects of
Executives’ Experiences and Perceptions on Their Assessment of Potential
Technological Alliances, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 939 (1998); cf. James P. Walsh,
Selectivity and Selective Perception: An Investigation of Managers’ Belief Structures
and Information Processing, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 873, 887-88 (1988).
60. See Anil K. Gupta & Vijay Govindarajan, Business Unit Strategy, Managerial
Characteristics, and Business Unit Effectiveness at Strategy Implementation, 27
ACAD. MGMT. J. 25, 36 (1984) (explaining that experience in marketing and sales
equips executives for increased ambiguity and lack of control); Tyler & Steensma,
supra note 59, at 944 (noting that engineering and technology as primary work
experience led executives to perceive greater opportunities and fewer risks in
technological alliances).
61. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE INSTINCT OF WORKMANSHIP AND THE INDUSTRIAL
ARTS 347 (1914).
What men can do easily is what they do habitually, and this decides what
they can think and know easily. They feel at home in the range of ideas
which is familiar through their everyday line of action. A habitual line of
action constitutes a habitual line of thought, and gives the point of view
from which facts and events are apprehended and reduced to a body of
knowledge. What is consistent with the habitual course of action is
consistent with the habitual line of thought, and gives the definitive ground
of knowledge as well as the conventional standard of complacency or
approval in any community.
Id. at 195.
62. See, e.g., John S. Carroll, Max H. Bazerman & Robin Maury, Negotiator

Cognitions: A Descriptive Approach to Negotiators’ Understanding of Their
Opponents, 41 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 352
(1988).
63. See Donald. C. Hambrick & Phyllis A. Mason, Upper Echelons: The
Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 193, 199
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differentiating department managers and CEOs by whether their
background was in an output function, such as those that relate to
sales (such as advertising and product development), or in a
throughput function, that relates to intra-organizational processes
(such as law and accounting), research found significant differences in
company behavior, such as diversification strategies. In particular,
this research suggests that the functional background of a compliance
officer matters:
[O]rganizations can improve their social performance through
the proactive promotion and recruiting of executives with
experience in environmental scanning. Managers with output
oriented backgrounds may be more sensitive to external
perceptions and therefore, perhaps more responsive to
problems that might jeopardize the perception of the
organization by its stakeholders. For example, Johnson and
Johnson’s timely response to the incidents of product
tampering, was largely credited to its experienced, market
oriented CEO. In contrast, managers with internally oriented
backgrounds [throughput functions] probably focus on
process and efficiency issues to a greater extent than social
issues.64
Other research uses organizational position, which often is linked
to professional background, to explain firm behavior. For example,
Delmas and Toffel describe legal and marketing departments
providing different “access points to institutional pressures” on
organizations and that this will influence managers’ sensitivity and
responses to different institutional pressures.65 Others study the
(1984). The article suggests dividing managers into those with significant experience
in output functions, such as product R&D, engineering, entrepreneurship, marketing,
and sales, which are externally-oriented activities that emphasize growth through
development of new products and markets, and in throughput functions, such as
process R&D, accounting, finance, production, administration, and legal, which focus
on improving the efficiency of the organization and transform inputs into outputs. Id.
All of our respondents have a background with throughput functions, with the
exceptions of some CEOs who may have risen out of output functions. According to
Hambrick and Mason, then, we should not expect to find any differences between
our respondents. But it also is difficult to see legal experts in compliance as in a
throughput function as their orientation is to external regulation and lawsuits.
64. Anisya S. Thomas & Roy L. Simerly, Internal Determinants of Corporate
Social Performance: The Role of Top Managers, 1995 ACAD. MGMT. PROC. 411, 414
(1995) (finding that CEOs and top management teams have independent influence
on corporate social performance and that the greater the internal orientation of the
team, the lower the corporate social performance).
65. See Magali A. Delmas & Michael W. Toffel, Organizational Responses to
Environmental Demands: Opening the Black Box, 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1027,
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occupational or educational background of the Board to predict firm
behavior.66
Weber distinguishes between the authority that derives from
incumbency in an organizational office and the authority that derives
from being ascribed superior expertise.67 Our respondents have both.
Our hypothesis is that they will use the authority of their office to
behave in professionally-biased ways.
It assumes that the
maintenance of their office, and possibly its attainment, stem from
their expertise-biased authority.
Although it may seem self-evident that there is a lawyer cast of
mind and that managers with different professional backgrounds view
problems differently, the evidence for this proposition is mixed.
Some have found effects of professional background on
organizational behavior.68 And others have not.69 This might reveal
1030 (2008); see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law:
The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 48–49 (1992);
Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity
Management: Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 AM.
BEHAV. SCI. 960 (1998); John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of
Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 AM.
SOC. REV. 794, 795 (1996).
66. For a recent example of this literature, see Scott G. Johnson, Karen
Schnatterly & Aaron D. Hill, Board Composition Beyond Independence: Social
Capital, Human Capital, and Demographics, 39 J. MGMT. 232 (2013), available at
http://jom.sagepub.com/content/39/1/232.full.pdf. For other examples of what is a
voluminous literature on boards, see A. Burak Guner, Ulrike Malmendier &
Geoffrey Alan Tate, The Impact of Boards with Financial Expertise on Corporate
Policies (NBER Working Paper W11914, 2006) (finding effects when commercial
bankers and finance professors join Board) and Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J.
Milliken, Cognition and Corporate: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic
Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 494–95 (1999).
67. See MAX WEBER, Legal Authority: The Pure Type with Employment of a
Bureaucratic Administrative Staff, in THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 329–36 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1947).
68. See, e.g., Rajeswararao Chaganti & Rakesh Sambharya, Strategic Orientation
and Characteristics of Upper Management, 8 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 393 (1987)
(finding that fewer executives with finance backgrounds and more executives with
production and R&D backgrounds resulted in firm following product innovation
strategy); Urs S. Daellenbach, Anne M. McCarthy & Timothy S. Schoenecker,
Commitment to Innovation: The Impact of Top Management Team Characteristics,
29 R&D MGMT. 199 (1999) (discussing higher R&D spending associated with CEO
background in technical work); Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition

and Corporate: Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making
Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 494–95 (1999); Vijay Govindarajan,
Implementing Competitive Strategies at the Business Unit Level: Implications of
Matching Managers to Strategies, 10 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 251 (1989) (discussing the
influence of background on firm’s competitive strategy); Pol Herrmann & Deepak K.
Datta, CEO Successor Characteristics and the Choice of Foreign Market Entry
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the “complexity of other factors that modify the importance” of
background.70 For example, weak relations between professional
background and organizational behavior may be found because
personality factors are intervening (and sometimes overwhelming)
factors. Or professional background may be found to be relevant
only because it is a proxy for cognitive and social processes. Indeed,
some have called for “a moratorium on the use of demographic
variables as surrogates for psychosocial constructs.”71

Mode: An Empirical Study, 33 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 551 (2002) (finding that
background was associated with international entry via joint ventures and contractual
arrangements, as opposed to acquisitions); Michael A. Hitt & Beverly B. Tyler,
Strategic Decision Models: Integrating Different Perspectives, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 327, 344–45 (1991); Mark I. Miller, Lawyers in Congress: What Difference Does it
Make?, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1 (1993) (discussing how lawyers behave
differently from non-lawyers); Sally S. Simpson & Christopher S. Koper, The
Changing of the Guard: Top Management Characteristics, Organizational Strain, and
Antitrust Offending, 13 J. QUANT. CRIM. 373 (1997) (finding CEOs with finance and
administrative backgrounds more likely to engage in antitrust violations); Mark
Smith & Michael C. White, Strategy, CEO Specialization, and Succession, 32 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 263 (1987) (discussing the link between a new CEOs functional background
and diversification strategy); Anisa S. Thomas, Robert J. Litschert & Kannan
Ramaswamy, The Performance Impact of Strategy-Manager Coalignment: An
Empirical Examination, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509 (1991) (finding that CEOs with
marketing, sales, and R&D functional backgrounds favored product and market
innovation strategies as opposed to accounting/finance, production, administration);
Mary J. Waller et al., Functional Background as a Determinant of Executives’
Selective Perception, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 943, 964–66 (1995); A. Burak Güner, Ulrike
Malmendier, & Geoffrey Alan Tate, The Impact of Boards with Financial Expertise
on Corporate Policies (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper W11914,
2006) (finding effects when commercial bankers and finance professors join Board).
69. See generally Bradley R. Agle et al., Who Matters to CEOs? An Investigation
of Stakeholder Attributes and Salience, Corporate Performance, and CEO Values,
42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 507 (1999); see also Janice M. Beyer et al., The Selective
Perception of Managers Revisited, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 716, 729 (1997); Marjorie A.
Lyles, Defining Strategic Problems: Subjective Criteria of Executives, 3 ORG. STUD.
263, 276 (1987) (finding no relationship between functional background and
approaches to problem formulation); Waller, supra note 68, at 964; Walsh, supra note
59, at 887–88 (replication of Dearborn and Simon). Finkelstein and Hambrick have
argued that these results may follow from greater cross-functional rotation of
managers and their broader training, so that it is inappropriate to classify executives
as having biases from a single functional background (and there is little
differentiation across firms in their CEOs’ portfolios of human capital). See SYDNEY
FINKELSTEIN & DONALD C. HAMBRICK, STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: TOP EXECUTIVES
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ORGANIZATIONS 95–96 (1996).
70. Richard Reed & Margaret Reed, CEO Experience and Diversification
Strategy Fit, 26 J. MGMT. STUD. 251, 267 (1989).
71. Kimberly B. Boal & Robert Hooijberg, Strategic Leadership Research:
Moving On, 11 LEADERSHIP Q. 515, 523 (2001); see also Barbara S. Lawrence, The
Black Box of Organizational Demography, 8 ORG. SCI. 1, 20 (1997); Patricia Pitcher
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Another line of research studies top management teams (rather
than individuals). Of particular interest has been the homogeneity or
heterogeneity of the functional backgrounds represented on the team;
the general finding is that heterogeneity is helpful.72 This line of
research too has been criticized for relying on demographic variables,
and another set of research has emerged that focuses on the
psychological processes of team decision-making.73 That research also
has been criticized for abstracting from individual managers’
personality attributes.74
Research on managers’ professional backgrounds and their
influence on company behavior replays the debate between Julius
Henry Cohen and those who opposed increasing the demographic
heterogeneity of the bar.75 Thus, there are those who believe that
professions create identities and casts of mind, as did Cohen
regarding lawyers. Nevertheless, there are others who believe that
pre-existing personality attributes and psychological dispositions are
the relevant explanatory variables for behavior. There are also
some—as the summary of the literature above also shows—who

& Anne D. Smith, Top Management Team Heterogeneity: Personality, Power and
Proxies, 12 ORG. SCI. 1, 15 (2001).
72. See Karen A. Bantel & Susan E. Jackson, Top Management and Innovations
in Banking: Does the Composition of the Top Team Make a Difference?, 10
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 107, 118 (1989) (finding that diversity of functional backgrounds
of top management teams was associated with organizational innovation); L. Richard
Hoffman & Norman R.F. Maier, Quality and Acceptance of Problem Solutions by
Members of Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups, 62 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCH. 401, 405 (1961); Sumita Raghuram & Raghu Garud, The Vicious and
Virtuous Facets of Workforce Diversity, in SELECTED RESEARCH ON WORK TEAM
DIVERSITY 155, 156 (Marian N. Ruderman et al. eds., 1995) (finding that
heterogeneous teams bring multiple perspectives to tasks and thereby outperform
homogeneous teams in generating ideas).
73. “Over the past decade, researchers have begun downplaying the influence of
TMT [Top Management Team] demographics on firm performance and increasingly
focus on the processes underlying TMT decision making such as comprehensiveness,
consensus, social integration, conflict, and decision speed.” S. Trevis Certo et al., Top

Management Teams, Strategy and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analytic
Examination, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 813, 814 (2006) (citations omitted) (analyzing prior
studies and finding these as the relevant variables).
74. For a discussion of various personality factors that have been found to bear a
relation to implementation of environmental compliance programs, see Esteban
Fernandez et al., Managers’ Profile in Environmental Strategy: A Review of the
Literature, 13 CORP. SOC. RESP. ENVTL. MGMT. 261, 265–68 (2006); see generally
Steven A. Frankforter et al., Determinants of Governance Structure Among
Companies: A Test of Agency Theory Predictions, 24 INT’L J. MGMT. 454 (2007)
(uses variety of personality factors to predict CEO behavior).
75. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text.
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believe that intrinsic psychological factors are determinative even
when individuals operate in group settings.
All sides in this debate agree that managers bring their identity
with them into business. The question is “what is brought?” The
virtuous lawyer cast of mind, as Cohen describes it, would bring
values independent from business. On the other hand, individual and
social psychology may have more impact on the lawyer outside the
profession than in it (as is reflected in the view that lawyers in
business are something less than lawyers). Confidence about
knowing which qualities travel with professionals as they become
managers does not emerge from this literature.
Various sociologists have opined on what travels with professionals
to business management. Institutionalists, like Selznick, would
understand lawyer psychological and social frames as being tested as
lawyers lead companies towards their mission76: Lawyers managing
compliance programs would be led by the company’s mission as they
lead the company to a more compliant one. There also are lines of
research that stress the importance of professional identity in business
by examining battles for jurisdiction to solve companies’ problems.77
Larson, for example, would join the professional and the bureaucrat.
She would find that the ability that “makes the use of discretion
predictable” travels with the lawyer.78 Although their visions of what
travels with the professional differ, and so too does their
understanding of professional power, both depict professionals acting
within companies in distinctive ways.
A New Institutional analysis of organizations suggests that a
company has reasons or pressures that lead it to select a compliance
manager with a particular occupational and professional
background.79 Some organizations might respond to these pressures
76. See, e.g., PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (Quid Pro Books 2011) (1957) (including preface by
Robert Eli Rosen).
77. See S. Carmona, M. Ezzamel & F. Gutiérrez, Towards an Institutional
Analysis of Accounting Change in the Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville, 25 ACCT.
HISTORIANS J. 115 (1998); Bruce G. Carruthers, Accounting, Ambiguity, and The
New Institutionalism, 20 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 313, 320, 325 (1995); Paul J. DiMaggio
& Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 150 (1983).
78. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 198 (1977).
79. For an early statement of the New Institutionalist position, see THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Paul DiMaggio & Walter Powell
eds., 1991).
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and choose the profession of the person in charge of compliance
mimetically, copying what others do.
In other organizations,
regardless of efficiency concerns, professionals are hired to
demonstrate “normative isomorphism,” to signal the company’s
professed alignment with social/professional norms.80 And some
organizations may perceive the importance of liberal values in
choosing which professionals should manage compliance.81
In all these organizations, the choice of a particular professional to
lead compliance is indicative of something about the organization
itself. A strong institutional account might suggest that pressures are
relieved by the managerial appointment. But, it may be that these
pressures go further and the professional’s cast of mind and its
influence on organizational behavior are precisely what the firm seeks
in choosing a leader with a particular professional background for its
compliance department. Analysis by the profession of the person in
charge of compliance would then reveal differences between
companies.
Other research focuses very closely on the exchanges between the
organization and its external environment.82 According to this
approach, in order to account for why a company might hire a lawyer
to manage compliance and determine whether the lawyer so hired
behaves distinctively, we must understand the different
interdependencies of the company with the environment. Because a
company responds to the environment it perceives, compliance
behavior depends on how legal constraints become meaningful to the
firm83: “[It] is the firm’s managers who determine which stakeholders
are salient and therefore will receive management’s attention.”84 And
often, the organization is not tightly coupled to its environment so
that: “[O]ne can identify a firm’s stakeholders . . . but managers may

80. See id.; see also Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational
Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147–48 (1983).
81. Cf. Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity in Global Law-Making: A Sociolegal
Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 263 (2009).
82. Organizations have collective interpretations of the environment that are
shaped by managers. See generally Jeffrey D. Ford & David A. Baucus,

Organizational Adaptation to Performance Downturns: An Interpretation-Based
Perspective, 12 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 366 (1987).
83. PARKER, supra note 25, at 57–60.
84. Ronald K. Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and
Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT.
REV. 853, 871 (1997).
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or may not perceive the stakeholder field correctly.”85 Managers
mediate the environment’s influence on company behavior, and they
determine the organization’s critical contingencies.86 On the other
hand, although the company is beset by “pragmatic ambiguity,” there
are interpretive, or hermeneutic, constraints that limit intra-firm
power struggles and reflect the company’s ties to its environment.87
Some research finds that many organizations are closely tied to their
environments and managers have little room for interpretive play.88
Our research, however, considers a weak and relatively undefined
compliance arena: there is room for the managers of compliance to
play.
In response to its interdependence with the law, personnel or subunits may be specially assigned to manage the firm’s response to an
aspect of its legal environment.89 To attain and maintain intraorganizational power and influence, managers of compliance have
incentives to portray the regulatory environment as powerful and
uncertain, as the company’s strategic contingencies.90 But what aspect
of the environment will be cast as strategic? Is there something
distinctive about the way a lawyer will paint the environment? We
hypothesize that the professional background of a manager influences
how the firm perceives and responds to its legal environment. For
example, we hypothesize that a chief executive officer (CEO) would
find the law to be meaningful to the firm differently than would a
general counsel. And we hypothesize that a compliance function
headed by the chief financial officer (CFO) would perceive and
respond to the law differently than would one headed by a
compliance professional.

85. Id.
86. See David J. Hickson et al., A Strategic Contingency Theory of
Intraorganizational Power, 16 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 216, 223 (1971).
87. See generally Helene Giroux, It Was Such a Handy Term: Management
Fashion and Pragmatic Ambiguity, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 1227 (2006). See also Jos
Benders & Kees Van Veen, What’s in a Fashion? Interpretive Viability and
Management Fashions, 8 ORGANIZATION 33, 37–39 (2001); Sandy Edward Green, Jr.,
A Rhetorical Theory of Diffusion, 29 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 653, 663 (2004).
88. H.E. ALDRICH, ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTS (1979); P.R. LAWRENCE
& J.W. LORSCH, ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT: MANAGING DIFFERENTIATION
AND INTEGRATION (1986).
89. See PARKER, supra note 25, at 53–55.
90. Christine Parker & Sharon Gilad, Compliance Management Systems:
Structure, Agency and Culture, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES
TO REGULATION 170–95 (C. Parker & V. Nielsen eds., 2011).
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If there is a relation between the profession of the manager in
charge of compliance and company behavior, then professional values
and ideologies are being carried by the firm. Professional schools and
organizations shape professional values and ideologies.
By
employing professionals as managers, if there is such a relation, then
the firm becomes open to influences by professional bodies,
educational institutions, and the collective mobility projects of
professionals.91 The literature leaves open whether there is such a
relation between the manager in charge of compliance and company
behavior.
III. OUR STUDY
A. Outline of Analytic Model and Hypotheses
Our main hypothesis is that the professional background of the
manager of the compliance function will be significant for the structure of
the company’s compliance system and for the company’s compliance
behaviors.
Some of the literature just reviewed predicts that our hypothesis will be
confirmed, but other of the literature does not. In particular, when a
lawyer is in charge of compliance, we hypothesize there will be significant
differences from when others are in charge. Very little of the literature
just reviewed concerns lawyers. Our research took place on largely
untrodden territory. Our hypothesis is that we will find differences
providing evidence that aspects of the lawyer cast of mind operate in the
company’s management of compliance.
Our research thus will
demonstrate what many have assumed, including Julius Henry Cohen,
that legal socialization creates framing effects that lawyers carry with them
in and out of legal practice. We have three reasons for this hypothesis: the
discretionary power of managers, the company’s selection of the
professional, and the self-serving biases of survey evidence.
Members of professions have been socialized into, educated by,
and connected to a professional community. Thereby they develop
different forms of analysis, reasoning, and preferred remedies.92 We
might therefore expect people from different professional or
occupational backgrounds to have different approaches to managing
compliance. They may have different natural taken-for-granted
reflexes about how to manage compliance issues. They may have

91. See id. at 168–96.
92. See generally ABBOTT, supra note 14.
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different values about what the organization’s priorities should be in
relation to compliance issues and how to value the economic and
social relationships with the organization’s stakeholders. They may
perceive the risk, and indeed the coercive pressure, of the
organization’s stakeholders in different ways. They also may value
differently the policy and managerial choices in governing compliance
behavior.
In the face of uncertainties about the goal of compliance, the discovery
and consequences of non-compliance and the costs of prevention, one
would expect that “biases” and “heuristics” would emerge to increase the
efficiency of decision-making.93 Professional expertise supplies such
cognitive shortcuts. Members of professions also have commitment
biases, so that “cognitive conservatism” and “self-serving biases” lead
them to interpretations that are consistent with and indeed require
professional expertise.94 At least from a cognitive perspective, then, we
expect that the manager in charge of compliance will exercise his or her
discretionary power in a manner that embeds professional norms inside
the company. Of course, the consequences of these cognitive frames—
either for efficiency or compliance—are not settled by their professional
source.
A second reason that we expect the profession of the person in
charge of compliance to make a difference focuses not on that
individual, but on his or her employer. Firms’ compliance and risk
management structures are responses to their environment—including
pressures from stakeholders and the likelihood of regulatory investigation,
enforcement, and sanction.95 But different firms will not necessarily
respond to the same combination of environmental pressures in the same
way: different firms balance or compromise between various stakeholder
and regulator pressures external to the firm in different ways.96 Firms

93. See, e.g., Bamberger, supra note 24, at 411 (discussing cognitive theory in the
context of regulation).
94. See id. at 422–23.
95. See Parker & Gilad, supra note 90, at 170–90; Christine Parker & Vibeke L.
Nielsen, Corporate Compliance Systems: Could They Make Any Difference?, 41
ADMIN. & SOC’Y 3, 6 (2009).
96. See, e.g., Christine Parker & Vibeke Nielsen, How Much Does It Hurt? How

Australian Businesses Think About the Costs and Gains of Compliance with the
Trade Practices Act, 32 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 555 (2008) [hereinafter Parker &
Nielsen, How Much Does It Hurt?]; see also PARKER, supra note 25, at 62-83; Vibeke
Nielsen & Christine Parker, To What Extent Do Third Parties Influence Business
Compliance?, 35 J. LAW & SOC’Y 309 (2008) [hereinafter Nielsen & Parker, Third
Parties].
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have different preferences regarding individual risks and total risk.97 Firms
frame external pressures differently and they will frame their responses in
different ways.98 Firms have compliance cultures.99 Regarding compliance
with legal norms, firms have their own norms.
One difference in firm compliance structures is in the nature of their
leadership. Firm compliance structures can be differentiated by the
professional background of their leader. In some firms, the CEO or senior
managers also manage various types of compliance. In others, a specialist
is hired to run a compliance function. In still others, chief legal officers or
a member of their staff manages compliance. And in others, chief
financial officers or a member of their staff manages compliance. The
selection of an agent from a profession to lead compliance may be an
indicator of the firm’s compliance culture. It is a company choice about
what behavior it seeks. In many cases, the firm seeks to reduce its
uncertainty and gain legitimacy by incorporating the practices of a
profession.100
The frailty of survey evidence is a third reason for expecting the
professional background of the survey respondent to be significantly
related to the reported compliance structures and practices. A survey
skeptic would be reluctant to accept the responses as being accurate
reflections of the company. Rather, the skeptic would focus on the values
and interests of the respondent. This leads straight back to the
professional background of the respondent, now not as determining
company behavior, but as determining the survey responses. If they view
the survey through their professional cast of mind, then self-serving, social
desirability and uncertainty-reducing biases will induce their responses to
reflect the normative and cognitive biases of their profession. Our analysis
of the surveys then should reveal differences by the professional
background of the respondents. In particular, a lawyer respondent who is
reflecting herself in her answers to our survey, if she had Cohen’s virtuous
cast of mind, would stress the importance of having a lawyer in charge of
compliance, depict her company as compliant with the law, imply legal
aspirations for herself and her company, and take a legalistic approach
wherever possible, especially in areas of uncertainty.

97.
98.
99.
100.

See sources cited supra note 96.
See sources cited supra note 96.
See Parker & Gilad, supra note 90, at 170–90.
See Edelman et al., supra note 65, at 50–51; Lauren B. Edelman et al., Legal
Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance: Affirmative Action Officers’ Dilemma, 13
LAW & POL’Y 73, 74–75 (1991) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity].
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model

On the basis of the literature and research described above, we
propose the model (shown in Figure 1) as to how the profession of
the person responsible for compliance influences the firm’s
compliance structures and substantive compliance behaviors. The
model posits that the professional’s cast of mind directly influences
how the professional will construct the compliance system and
practices. For example, lawyers will construct different compliance
systems than would those in finance. “Stakeholders” are the
individuals and groups who have the ability to sanction firm noncompliance, either through the withdrawal of esteem,101 or the
imposition of economic costs. The model also posits that professions

101. Cf. Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 355–57 (1997). The ACCC has neither the resources nor the
powers to monitor and enforce business compliance with the law on a proactive basis,
and its enforcement activity is primarily driven by one-off responses to complaints.
Moreover, at the time of the research the ACCC had powers only to investigate
potential contraventions and to take alleged offenders to court for the imposition of
civil (rarely criminal) penalties, injunctions, and other orders. In the case of a
“reactive” regulator like the ACCC, the actors with the most frequent and crucial
regulatory roles are likely to be third parties. The ACCC usually only investigates
potential breaches where there has been a complaint by a customer, supplier, or
competitor, or where a media story makes it obvious that there could be a breach.
Moreover, since the ACCC does not investigate or take enforcement action in
relation to most complaints, the only direct experience of “enforcement” that many
non-compliant businesses are likely to experience is the actions of third parties.

ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

4/15/2013 5:48 PM

2012] FRAMING EFFECTS OF PROFESSIONALISM

321

differently assess the firm’s environment and the firm’s stakeholders.
In particular, individuals from different professions will weigh
differently the monitoring of the firm’s compliance by third parties.
Lawyers, for example, may weigh the response of legal regulators to
be more important than the responses of customers, who may be
more important to business executives.
We expect that the
professional cast of mind will influence the probability of detection
assigned to different third parties, and also influence the probabilities
assigned to losses from detection and the magnitude of such losses.
These different assessments of third parties will themselves cause
changes in the compliance structures and practices at the firms. If the
professional cast of mind influences how the environment is
perceived, and how the environment is perceived directly affects
compliance, then the profession of the person in charge of compliance
indirectly influences the firm’s compliance structures and behaviors.
This model generates two main hypotheses about the direct and
indirect effects of the professional orientation of the person
responsible for compliance on the way the firm manages compliance,
respectively. The two sets of hypotheses are indicated in Figure 1 by
labeled arrows.
Hypothesis 1: Direct Effect of Professional Orientation:
Reported compliance behaviors will differ between firms who have
individuals from different professions in charge of compliance.

Hypothesis 1A: The profession of the “individual in charge of
compliance” will make for differences in the formal compliance
system elements that they report have been implemented at their
firm.

Hypothesis 1B: The profession of the “individual in charge of
compliance” will make for differences in the substantive management
behaviors aimed at promoting compliance that they report have been
implemented at their firm.
Hypothesis 2: Indirect Effect of Professional Orientation: Firms
with individuals from different professions in charge of compliance
will be reported to perceive the costs and risks of non-compliance
differently, which will in turn influence the reported compliance
management behaviors that are in place.
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Hypothesis 2A: The profession of the “individual in charge of
compliance” will make for differences in the reported concerns about
the loss of esteem by and economic sanctions from various
stakeholders if they breach the law.
Hypothesis 2B: The profession of the “individual in charge of
compliance” will make for differences in their assessments of the risks
of (i) stakeholders and (ii) regulators detecting non-compliance.
Hypothesis 2C: These different analyses of the costs and risks
of compliance will lead to differences in what formal systems and
more substantive management behaviors firms have in place to
promote compliance—so that the profession of the person
responsible for compliance will have an indirect effect on compliance
management behaviors.
Of course, the person in charge of compliance is not the only factor
influencing a firm’s risk analysis and compliance behaviors. We also
expect each firm’s history in relation to compliance and its size,
resources, and managerial competence102 to influence its compliance
risk analyses and compliance behaviors. These are our control
variables.
We explain the way in which we test these hypotheses and the
measures we use for each of these concepts in the following section.
B.

Data and Research Strategy

1.

Data

Our data comes from a quantitative survey of business experience
of enforcement and compliance in relation to Australia’s national
competition and consumer protection legislation, the Trade Practices
Act of 1974 (Cth) (TPA).103 The TPA applies to all Australian

102. Originally we also controlled for industry, but it had no effect and, therefore,
for the sake of simplicity we have left it out of our model. Industry was classified
according to Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian and New Zealand Standard
Industrial Classification, ABS Catalogue No 1292.0, (66-74) (2006) (“ANZSIC”).
The statistics are on file with the authors.
103. For more detail, see Vibeke Nielsen & Christine Parker, The ACCC
Enforcement and Compliance Survey: Report of Preliminary Findings (2005). Note
that on January 1, 2011, the TPA was renamed the Competition and Consumer Act
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businesses and prohibits certain anti-competitive conduct (e.g., pricefixing, abuse of market power, etc.), unfair trading practices
(especially misleading and deceptive advertising), non-compliance
with legislated product safety standards, and unconscionable conduct
in business dealings.104 The 2,321 largest Australian businesses
trading in 2004 and readily contactable were identified (through a
publicly available commercial list, the Dun and Bradstreet list), with
special efforts made to include all those large businesses that had
been the target of ACCC enforcement activity in the previous seven
years, as identified by ACCC Annual Reports.105
The businesses were surveyed with a mailed self-completion
questionnaire, and repeated telephone follow-up yielding 999
responses—a response rate of 43%.106 Our response rate compares
well with the 35.5% average response rates for similar questionnaire
research of top management of business.107 The profile of our
respondents compares well with the profile of the whole list of the
largest Australian businesses in terms of size and industry.108
The questionnaire was to be filled in by the most senior person in
the organization responsible for trade practices compliance, with a
focus on contacting first the compliance manager, then the in-house
counsel, the company secretary, the CFO, and, finally, the CEO, in
that order. Forty-two percent of those who filled out a questionnaire

(Cth). Since this research and these data predate that change, the legislation is
referred to throughout as the TPA.
104. The concerns of the TPA include those that first attracted U.S. attention to
the importance of internal controls. See Cunningham, supra note 22, at 278–79
(discussing the antitrust scandals of the 1960s).
105. Two hundred seventy-three of the 2,321 businesses surveyed were identified
in this way.
106. This underestimates the actual response rate because we cut 4.3% of the
responses actually received from the study because those respondents were too small
(less than 100 employees) for our sample of large businesses. If we, quite reasonably,
assume that similarly 4.3% of the entire list of companies surveyed (including nonrespondents) were “too small,” then we would have a response rate of 45%. For a
full report of the survey, including the sample and methodology, see Nielsen &
Parker, supra note 103, at 7–19; see also Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann
Nielsen, The ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Project: Explanation of Project
MELBOURNE
L.
SCH.
CARTEL
PROJECT,
and
Methodology,
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/cartel/related-projects/the-australian-competitionand-consumer-commission-enforcement-and-compliance-project (last updated Dec.
12, 2012).
107. Yehuda Baruch, Response Rate in Academic Studies—A Comparative
Analysis, 52 HUM. REL. 421, 431 (1999) (reporting that average for that type of
questionnaire in articles published in high quality management journals is 35.5%).
108. See Nielsen & Parker, supra note 103, at 12–13.

ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

324

4/15/2013 5:48 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XL

were CEOs, company secretaries or CFOs, and a further twenty
percent general counsel or compliance managers. There were 263
CFOs, 123 CEOs, and 81 Chief Legal Officers (CLOs) or General
Counsels.
Eighty-five of the respondents were compliance
professionals. Because we did not collect information on graduate
degrees, we proceed by assuming that the current occupational
position reflects the individual’s profession. To the extent this
assumption is inaccurate, its significance is minimized because current
occupational position also has significant framing effects that match
the profession normally associated with the occupational position.109
Table 1. Profession of Respondents
Profession

Number (and percentage)

Legal or General Counsel

181 (18%) (incl. 81 Chief Legal Officers)

Business Executive

288 (29%) (incl. CEO=123)

Finance Officer

316 (32%) (incl. CFO=263)

Compliance Officer

85 (9%)

Company Secretary

95 (10%)

Unknown

34 (3%)

TOTAL

999 (100%) (34 missing from total sample)

2.

Research Strategy

To measure the effect of professionalism, we conduct two
regressions—one including the profession of the individual in charge
of TPA compliance and one without in order to see what difference,
if any, it makes. In other words, we compare the results and
explanatory power of testing a model that does not include the
profession of the person responsible for compliance as an
independent variable with one that does. This helps us test the extent
to which professional orientation has an influence on compliance
management behavior.
We test our hypotheses in two stages using regression analyses (see
Tables 10 and 11 explained and discussed below). Our control
variables are included in all these regressions.
First, we test the extent to which the profession of the individual
who is in charge of TPA compliance makes a direct difference to how
109. Cognitive structures vary according to current organizational position (where
you stand depends on where you sit). See Paul S. Goodman, The Measurement of an
Individual’s Organizational Map, 13 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 246 (1968).
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he or she reports the way the organization manages TPA compliance
in terms of implementation of formal compliance systems and
substantive compliance management behavior (testing Hypotheses
1A and 1B).
In the same series of regressions we also test the impacts of the way
the firm weighs worries about different stakeholder pressures in
relation to TPA compliance and the way it assesses the risk of
stakeholder action in relation to TPA compliance (including
regulatory enforcement action) on compliance management behavior.
Hypothesis 2C states that the profession of the person responsible for
compliance should have an indirect effect on compliance
management behavior by influencing these risk analyses of noncompliance by the firm. We need to determine which risk analyses do
in fact have any effect on compliance management behavior to
specify our test of Hypotheses 2A and 2B (concerning the influence
of professional orientation on the firm’s risk analyses) so as not to
include effects irrelevant to compliance.
We then test whether the profession of the person responsible for
compliance has any influence on the way the firm is reported to weigh
worries about pressures in relation to TPA compliance from different
stakeholders and the way it assesses the risk of stakeholder pressure.
In these regressions we test for professional influence only on those
worries about stakeholders that we found have an influence on
compliance management behaviors. As with our other analyses, we
also conduct two sets of regressions so that we can compare the
explanatory power of including the profession of the individual in
charge of TPA compliance and not including the profession of the
individual in charge. This helps us to be more confident as to whether
or not the profession of the person responsible for compliance makes
any difference. The measures used are described immediately below
and the results are described and discussed in the following section.
The explanatory model has been estimated using ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression. Appropriate visual inspections and
statistical tests were conducted to verify that OLS regression
assumptions were met for these models. To test the robustness of the
model—and as far as possible exclude the possibility that our findings
are not simply random experimental effects created by the large
amount of variables—we use low p-values, making it harder to get
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significant results.110 We also tested for multicorrelation, and found
nothing above level of tolerance.
In each regression we exclude insignificant variables one at a time
(apart from the profession of the person responsible for compliance
which is the focus of our model). The final regressions only are
shown. That is, the final regressions show only variables for which
any significant association was found and none for which no
significant association was found.

3.

Measures

Each of our measures is based on our respondents’ self-reported
answers to questions in our surveys. The wording of each question
was based on our earlier qualitative and documentary research on the
nature of ACCC enforcement activities and their impact on business
compliance,111 as well as theoretical considerations and previous
studies.
Self-report measures are particularly useful where the object of
interest is a perception or attitude.112 Our interest in the lawyer’s cast
of mind, and different professional orientations, can be elicited by
self-reports as respondents’ perceptions provide good evidence of
certain aspects of professional orientation. Of course, self-reports are
not merely self-referential. They do tell us something about the
firms. In large business organizations no one person may have
sufficient knowledge of all parts of the organization or its history to
be able to answer a survey accurately. The high rank and position of
those who actually filled out the questionnaire for each organization
(see Table 1 above) suggests that we may have succeeded in finding
the person in the organization best informed about trade practices
compliance to fill out our questionnaire.
A more fundamental problem with self-report measures is that
respondents might show social desirability or other biases that make

110. We also estimated the model including the most theoretically likely
interaction variables (between size of company and each different worry). None of
these turned out to be significant which is why they were left out of the model in the
end.
111. See CHRISTINE PARKER & NATALIE STEPANENKO, COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT PROJECT: PRELIMINARY RESEARCH REPORT 5–13 (2003).
112. Vibeke L. Nielsen & Christine Parker, Mixed Motives: Economic, Social, and
Normative Motivations in Business Compliance, 34 LAW & POL’Y 428, 438 (2012).
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it difficult for them to answer questions truthfully.113 Like other
researchers, we sought to overcome this set of potential reliability
problems by making (and following through on) strict guarantees of
confidentiality and anonymity in our handling of the data in order to
ensure that respondents felt they could safely answer questions
honestly. Moreover, to the extent possible, we framed our questions
as specifically as possible so that it should be relatively easy for the
person filling out the questionnaire to objectively determine whether
the answer should be yes or no, eliminating as far as possible the
element of subjectivity that makes it easier to respond in a socially
desirable way. The examples in Table 2 illustrate the types of
questions we asked. Nevertheless our results should be interpreted
bearing in mind that they rely on self-reports only, and that they
therefore may reflect limited knowledge and the way respondents feel
they should think and behave. In the context of the analysis in this
Article, however, this is, in a sense, a strength. Although the
responses may be biased judgments of how their firm behaves, they
also may be self-servingly biased, reflecting normative conceptions of
thought and behavior of the respondent’s specific professional
background.

4.Testing Hypothesis 1: Compliance Behavior of Respondent’s
Company
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we evaluate the extent of influence of
the type of professional in charge of compliance on two measures of
compliance
management
behaviors
of
the
businesses—
implementation of (formal) compliance management systems and the
(substantive) way compliance is managed in practice.114
(a) Implementation of formal compliance system elements (Table
2): The questionnaire asked respondents to provide yes or no answers
to a series of twenty-one very specific questions about whether their
organization had implemented various procedures and actions
113. Christine Parker & Vibeke L. Nielsen, The Challenge of Empirical Research
on Business Compliance in Regulatory Capitalism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 45, 62
(2009).
114. For further detail and justification of these measures, and discussion of
descriptive statistics from these measures, see Nielsen & Parker, supra note 103, at
30–64; Christine Parker & Vibeke L. Nielsen, Do Businesses Take Compliance

Systems Seriously? An Empirical Study of Implementation of Trade Practices
Compliance Systems in Australia, 30 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 441, 451 (2006)
[hereinafter Parker & Nielsen, Do Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?].
See generally Parker & Nielsen, supra note 95.
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expected to be part of a good (formal) compliance system.115 The
questions were later grouped into four different indices measuring the
implementation of system elements concerning a) complaints
handling, b) communication and training from the top of the
organization to employees, c) management accountability and
whistle-blowing, and d) compliance performance measurement and
discipline. We use these four measures to look at four different
dimensions of compliance system implementation (rather than one
index of all the items) because businesses will not necessarily
implement all potential aspects of compliance systems equally.116 On
the other hand, using these four indices rather than looking at
variation in each of the twenty-one elements individually gives a
clearer picture that takes into account the fact that there are different
ways of performing the different functions of a compliance system.117
Table 2. Measure of Implementation of Four Aspects of (Formal) Compliance
Systems
% Answering
Four Aspects

Questions (Yes/No)

Yes
(n=958–982)

Complaints

In my organization there is a clearly defined system for

Handling

handling complaints from customers/clients;

Mean: 57

In my organization we keep records of complaints from

Std.dev.: 24
Min: 0
Max: 100

customers, competitors and/or suppliers;

91

87

In my organization there is a clearly defined system for
handling compliance failures identified by staff,

53

competitors, suppliers or the ACCC;
In my organization we actively seek out consumer
opinion about new advertising and/or new products;
In my organization we have a hotline for complaints
about our compliance with the TPA.

40

13

115. See PARKER, supra note 25, at 302–11.
116. These four indices are treated as formative indices made by adding the score
for each variable together. The logic behind this is that the more elements the
business has implemented, the more it is trying to comply. In contrast to reflective
indices, we do not necessarily expect interdependence between the variables included
in the index. Therefore it makes no sense to test for reliability.
117. We also conducted the regression analyses reported below on each of the
twenty-one measures individually—but found no major difference in the patterns of
influence from what is reported in this Article: statistics on file with the authors.
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Training
Mean: 31
Std. dev.: 33

My organization has a written compliance policy about

45

trade practices compliance;
In my organization employees are now and then sent to a

38

brush up course on how to comply with the TPA;

Min: 0
Max: 100

329

Live training sessions are a part of our training of

34

employees in trade practices compliance;
In our organization we use a compliance manual in trade

31

practices compliance;
My organization has a dedicated compliance function

30

taking care of trade practices compliance;
Induction for new employees includes substantial

28

training in trade practices compliance;
At least half our employees have attended an employee

21

seminar about the TPA during the last 5 years;
In my organization we use a computer based training

17

program in trade practices compliance.
Management
Accountability
& Whistleblowing
Mean: 30
Std. dev.: 30

My organization has written policies to encourage and

43

protect internal whistleblowers;
In the last 5 years an external consultant has reviewed

35

our compliance system;
In my organization managers are asked to report

26

regularly on compliance;

Min: 0
Max: 100

In my organization we have systematic audits by external

17

professionals to check for trade practices breaches.
Compliance

Trade practices compliance performance indicators are

Performance

included in the corporate plan;

Measurement &
Discipline
Mean: 15
Std. dev.: 26
Min: 0
Max: 100

Compliance performance indicators relevant for the

20

13

TPA are among the individual performance indicators
for our employees;
In my organization in the last 5 years employees have

12

been disciplined for breaching our trade practices
compliance policy.

(b) Compliance management in practice (Table 3): Implementation
of a compliance system is aimed at putting formal structures in place
that managers and employees can use to identify, prevent and correct
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compliance.118 This should be helpful in influencing the way activities
are managed in practice to improve actual compliance. But it is not
enough on its own.119 It is possible for an organization to implement
the various elements of compliance management programs in a
formulaic, formalistic, or purely symbolic way.120 But the key to a
compliance management program’s impact on compliance will be the
impact it has on everyday routines and practices.121 Effective
compliance management in practice means that management and
employees identify compliance problems, communicate them to those
who can fix them, and rectify them as a part of their everyday
routines and practices.122 The aim of compliance management
programs is to ensure compliance by improving compliance
management in practice. Again we constructed a single measure by
adding together fourteen questions containing specific statements
about what business management actually does in order to make sure
they comply with the TPA (shown in Table 3).

118. See Parker & Gilad, supra note 90, at 170–90; Parker & Nielsen, Do
Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?, supra note 114, at 450–52; Parker &
Nielsen, supra note 95, at 4.
119. See SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 144–
45 (2002); Marie McKendall, Beverly DeMarr & Catherine Jones-Rikkers, Ethical
Compliance Programs and Corporate Illegality: Testing the Assumptions of the
Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 137, 380 (2002); Parker &
Nielsen, supra note 95, at 27.
120. See Sharon Gilad, Institutionalizing Fairness in Financial Markets: Mission
Impossible?, 5 REG. & GOVERNANCE 309, 309 (2011).
121. See Hambrick & Mason, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
122. See Hambrick & Mason, supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Table 3. Management in Practice
Mean Responses for
Each Question
Questions

(Scale from 1–5
‘Strongly disagree’ to

Whole
Measure

‘Strongly agree’.)
In our organization the people responsible for

4.10

compliance find it easy to get access to top management;
In my organization compliance problems are quickly

Alpha: 0.83
3.99

communicated to those who can act on them;
In my organization systemic and recurring problems of
sufficient authority to correct them;
3.69

and organizational standards are integrated into my
organization’s day to day operating procedures;
Managers in our organization know what aspects of

3.61

compliance they are responsible for;
Compliance failures are always investigated to

3.58

understand their cause;
In our organization everyone knows where the buck

3.58

stops for compliance (reversed);
My organization allocates adequate resources to enable

3.40

the implementation of the compliance policy;
In my organization we review our compliance program

3.39

on a regular basis;
My organization is not one of those organizations that

2.96

try to have the best compliance of any organization in
the country (reversed);
My organization invests a lot of time and money in

2.94

compliance training;
My organization sometimes spends time and resources

2.69

figuring out how to get what we want without directly
breaching the Trade Practices Act;
In my organization compliance advice is often ignored

2.14

by line managers (reversed);
In my organization compliance advice is often ignored
by the board (If you don’t have a board, please skip this
question) (reversed).

Mean: 3.51
n=869–993

3.77

non-compliance are always reported to those with

Compliance requirements of laws, regulations, codes

Cronbach

1.79
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Testing Hypothesis 2: Respondent Company’s Risk Analyses

Risk analysis requires determining both the magnitude of the loss
and the probability that the loss will occur.123 As there are multiple
stakeholders who can sanction non-compliance, the salience of a
stakeholder sanction must be determined in addition to the weight it
is accorded.124 As the regulator is reactive,125 we add to the measure
of legal detection of non-compliance, detection by stakeholders.
(a) Respondents’ Weighting of Losses from Different Stakeholders
(Table 4): We measure the way the firm weighs the magnitude of loss
for non-compliance resulting from sanctions from different
stakeholders by a series of questions asking about how much they
would worry about (i) economic losses in relation to various different
stakeholders if their firm was accused of breaches of the TPA; and (ii)
losses of respect and esteem in relation to various different
stakeholders if their firm was accused of breaches of the TPA. These
questions are all predicated on the hypothetical that the firm is
“accused of breaches of the TPA one day in the future.” In so doing,
we attempt to segregate out the seriousness of the norm violation
from the probability of it being detected.
The businesses worry most by far about economic losses in relation
to customers (46% worry “a lot” and 37% worry “very much”) and
then shareholders (42% worry “a lot” and 39% worry “very
much”).126 The next highest was only 39% worrying “a lot” or “very
much” about economic losses from employees.127 As with worries
about economic losses, the businesses worry most about losing the
respect or esteem of customers (33% worry “a lot” and 58% “very
much”) and shareholders (84% worry “a lot” or “very much”).128 But
the vast majority (83%) would also worry “a lot” or “very much”
about losing the respect or esteem of employees, and 73% would
worry “a lot” or “very much” about business partners.129
In our tests of Hypothesis 1 (see Table 4 below) we test the extent
to which these various worries explain variation in what businesses do

123. See Parker & Nielsen, How Much Does It Hurt?, supra note 96, at 562.
124. See id. at 564; Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties, supra note 96, at 313.
125. See Parker & Nielsen, Do Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?,
supra note 114, at 445.
126. For further discussion of these findings, see Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties,
supra note 96, at 317.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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with regards to compliance. It is not necessarily the case, however,
that the more and more businesses worry about third party reactions
to non-compliance, the more and more they will continue to try to
improve their compliance behavior. It seems more reasonable to
expect there to be some “tipping point” at which a certain degree of
worry about third parties motivates change in compliance behavior.
Inspection of the data,130 however, could not identify any consistent
“tipping point” at which a certain degree of worry about third parties
was, on average, associated with a significant change in compliance
behavior.
Another way of modeling the relationship between worries about
third parties and business behavior—especially in the light of the fact
that most businesses worry quite a lot in relation to most third
parties—is to hypothesize that it is only worries above the average
that we can expect to have any effect on behavior. In the regression
analyses reported in Table 10, therefore, we measure whether or not
worrying about specific third parties more than average has an effect
on compliance behavior or not.131 We do this by transforming the
measures of worries about third parties described above into dummy
variables measuring whether or not each business rates their worries
about third parties in the event of non-compliance as higher than the
mean.132
In the tests of Hypothesis 2 reported in Table 11, however, since
we are interested in the extent to which the profession of the person
responsible for compliance (and other variables) explains variation in
the various worries about stakeholders, we do not use these dummy
variables. Instead we use as dependent variables the original ratings
of one to five given by the firm respondents about the extent to which
they worried about each stakeholder.

130. This inspection was carried out by running a one way ANOVA-test of each
variable measuring worries about third parties against the dependent variables to see
if there was any significant difference in the score on the dependent variable
associated with one of the five levels of worry compared to the other four.
131. For previous uses of this technique, see, e.g., Vibeke Nielsen, Power in Public
Implementation: A Complex, but Important Part of Power Studies, 28
SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 349, 357 (2005); Vibeke Nielsen, Differential Treatment

and Communicative Interactions: Why the Character of Social Interaction Is
Important, 29 LAW & POL’Y 257, 271 (2007).
132. Mean or less than the mean = 0; more than the mean = 1.

ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

334

4/15/2013 5:48 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XL

Table 4. Weighting of Losses from Different Stakeholders if Accused of Breach
of TPA
If your organization were accused of breaches of the

Mean (Standard Deviation)

TPA one day in the future, how much would your

1 to 5 (“Worry very little” to

organization worry about . . .

“Worry very much”)

Economic

. . . economic losses in relation to the following groups of people: (n=924–964)
Your customers

4.18 (0.99)

Your shareholders

4.08 (1.06)

Your employees

3.87 (1.04)

The media

3.52 (1.27)

Your business partners

3.50 (1.12)

Consumer groups/NGOs

3.13 (1.29)

Informal business networks

2.99 (1.17)

Other organizations in your industry

2.90 (1.23)

Your suppliers

2.82 (1.28)

Your industry association

2.73 (1.31)

Total mean (all added together)

3.37 (0.85)

Social
. . . losing the respect and esteem of the following groups of people? (n=939–973)
Your customers

4.41 (0.87)

Your shareholders

4.22 (1.02)

Your employees

4.13 (0.97)

Your business partners

3.83 (1.02)

The media

3.66 (1.22)

Consumer groups/NGOs

3.51 (1.20)

Other organizations in your industry

3.28 (1.24)

Your industry association

3.27 (1.24)

Your suppliers

3.26 (1.23)

Informal business networks

3.21 (1.19)

Lawyers/compliance professionals

3.14 (1.26)

Politicians

3.13 (1.30)

Relatives

3.03 (1.27)

Total mean (all added together)

3.54 (0.83)
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(b) Respondents’ Assessment of Detection Risk (Tables 5 and 6):
We measure respondents’ assessment of the risk of detection for TPA
violations, differentiating between informal and formal sanctioning
processes.
(i) “Risk from Third Parties”: The respondents’ perception as

to the likelihood that third parties would notice whether they
breached the TPA: a single measure that puts together responses to
three separate questions asking respondents to consider whether their
trade practices are being closely observed by consumers, suppliers
and business partners, respectively (shown in Table 5).

(ii) “Likelihood of ACCC Enforcement” and “Seriousness of
Risk of ACCC Enforcement”: respondents’ perceptions of the
likelihood and seriousness of ACCC enforcement action (shown in
Table 6).
Table 5. Measure of Perceived Risk of Complaints from Third Parties
Mean (Standard
Mark the number closest to the view of
most managers in your organization:

Deviation)
1 to 5 (‘Strongly

Whole Measure

disagree’ to ‘Strongly
agree’)

Our customers are aware of the TPA and
keep a close eye on our compliance.
Our suppliers are keeping a close eye on our
trade practices.
Our business partners focus a lot on the TPA
and keep an eye on our compliance.

3.59 (1.00)

Mean: 3.19
Std. dev.: 0.86
Min: 1

3.52 (0.96)

Max: 5
Cronbach’s Alpha:

3.47 (0.95)

0.86
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Table 6. Measures of Likelihood & Severity of ACCC Enforcement Action
Mean (Standard
Deviation)
1 to 5 (‘Strongly

Whole Measure

disagree’ to ‘Strongly
agree’)
Likelihood of ACCC Enforcement
If we breach the TPA the chances of the ACCC
catching us are large.

3.35 (1.01)

Std. dev: 0.67
Min: 1

If we were caught by the ACCC in breach of the
TPA the prospects of ACCC enforcement against

Mean: 3.14

3.77 (0.91)

the organization are large.

Max: 5
Cronbach’s alpha:

It is easy for the ACCC to find out when
organizations breach the law.
In the light of the size and complexity of their
task the ACCC has appropriate resources.
A breach of the TPA does not have to be severe
before the ACCC bothers to do anything about it.

0.73
2.82 (1.03)

2.67 (1.01)

3.18 (1.02)

The investigative staff of the ACCC is very
competent compared to the staff and lawyers of

2.89 (0.80)

the companies they are regulating.
The ACCC is generally keeping a close eye on
our industry

3.23 (1.07)

Seriousness of Risk of ACCC Enforcement
The level of sanctions imposed for trade practices
breaches is generally very high.

Mean: 3.5
3.35 (0.98)

Std. dev.: 0.76
Min: 1

The ACCC has a wide range of effective
sanctions against non-complying organizations.

6.

Max: 5
3.65 (0.90)

Cronbach’s alpha:
0.44

Main Independent Variable

Our survey was to be filled out on behalf of the organization by the
most senior person in the organization with day-to-day responsibility
for TPA compliance. We asked this person to write down their job
description. These answers were then coded into business executives

ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

4/15/2013 5:48 PM

2012] FRAMING EFFECTS OF PROFESSIONALISM

337

(including CEO of the business), legal counsel (including General
Counsel),133 finance officers (including CFOs), compliance officers,
and Company Secretaries. In Australia, the Company Secretary is an
executive managerial position, fundamentally different in
responsibilities than in the United States.134 The number and
proportion in each category are shown in Table 1, supra. For the
regression analyses reported in this Article, we created five dummy
variables to represent each of these groups of respondents.135 We
coded as a lawyer any Australian respondent who so self-identified.

7.

Control Variables

a.

The Firm’s History

The firm’s past compliance and non-compliance with the TPA are
likely to influence how the firm manages compliance and how it
assesses the costs and benefits of compliance and the risks of
detection. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain reliable measures of
the organization’s past (and present) compliance and noncompliance. Instead, we examine the impact of complaints about
non-compliance. We thus only examine the slice of the firm’s history
in which stakeholders have been acknowledged as attempting to
sanction the company. The experience of these pressures may
account for features of the formal compliance process as well as how
compliance is managed in practice. The experience of these pressures
also may account for how the firm now assesses the seriousness and
risk of non-compliance.
(i) “Stakeholder Criticism” (Table 7): a measure of how often each
business had been criticized by various external parties in relation to

133. In thirty-one responses to our survey, a person described himself or herself as
both a legal counsel and also a company secretary or compliance officer. Wherever a
person described himself as legal counsel, they have been counted only as legal
counsel for the purposes of the analyses reported in this Article. This is because we
are interested in whether identifying oneself as a lawyer makes a difference.
134. Compare What Does a Governance Professional Do?, CHARTERED
SECRETARIES AUSTL.,
http://www.csaust.com/knowledge-resources/governancefoundations/what-does-a-governance-professional-do.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2013),
with Role of a Secretary, SOC’Y CORP. SECRETARIES & GOVERNANCE PROFS.,
http://main.governanceprofessionals.org/GOVERNANCEPROFESSIONALS/Abou
t/RoleofSecretary/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2013). See also Rosen, Diffusion, supra note
18, at 1304–08 (discussing different understandings of the role of the corporate
secretary).
135. A dummy variable is a variable that has only two possible outcomes—e.g., is the
respondent a legal or general counsel? Yes (1) and no (0).
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their trade practices compliance136 (divided into three groups—those
who had experienced no criticism from any of the name groups; those
who had experienced criticism from between one and seven of the
various types of stakeholder; and those who had experienced criticism
from between eight and fifteen of the various types of stakeholder).
In an attempt to avoid self-serving denials, the question asked not
only whether the firm but also whether comparable “others” had
been criticized. When such criticism is known, even if it is indirect, it
becomes part of the firm’s history.
Table 7. Measure of Level of Criticism by Third Parties
Below you will find a number of different
groups of people who may have criticized

%

your organization or others in your industry Respondents
for their perceived failure to comply with

Reporting

the TPA. For each of these, please state

Criticism

whether they have expressed such a

(n=999)

criticism within the past six years.
The ACCC

25%

Customers

26%

Competitors

17%

Media

12%

Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC)

Index (the number of groups
who have criticized have been
added together for each
respondent. After that the
scores have been divided into
three categories):
n = 999
Mean: 1.45
Std. dev.: 0.57
Min.: 1
Max.: 3

12%

Consumer groups/NGOs

11%

Employees

10%

Lawyers/compliance professionals

10%

136. The questionnaire gave respondents a list of different groups of people
(shown in Table 7) and they were asked to indicate which, if any, had expressed
criticism of “your organization or others in your industry for their perceived failure to
comply with the Trade Practices Act” within the past six years. As Table 7 shows,
only very few businesses reported that each group had criticized them or others in
their industry. Most of the respondent businesses have never been criticized (53%),
while 1% of the businesses reported they had been criticized by all the mentioned
groups of people. Customers, competitors, and the media were the most common
groups from which criticism was experienced, with customers by far the most
frequent. This distribution of the actual experience of complaint is consistent with
the respondents’ perception of the risk of complaints where 48% of respondents
reported that they agreed that their customers were keeping a close eye on their
compliance with the TPA. The Pearson’s correlation exists between the two
measures if 0.201 and it is statistically significant at a 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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Politicians

9%

Suppliers

8%

Industry association

8%

Business partners

6%

Shareholders

5%

Relatives of management

2%

Informal business networks

2%

339

(ii) “ACCC Investigation”: Participants were asked whether
the firm had been the subject of an ACCC investigation in the
previous six years,137 because this situation represents significant
coercive pressure from a regulatory agency. Fourteen percent (141)
of all respondents self-reported they had been the subject of an
ACCC investigation of an alleged breach by their business. The vast
majority of ACCC investigations (over 90%) result in a settlement or
court order in which the business suffers some adverse consequences
(e.g., payment of compensation, financial penalties, and
implementation of a compliance system).138

b.

Firm-Level Factors

In previous analyses of our respondents’ compliance behavior, we
have found the level of management oversight and planning to be
very important, and size and resources also to be influential.139
(i) “Size”: We might expect that larger firms are more likely to
have done more to implement compliance systems and manage
compliance since the costs of doing so should be relatively lower for
them. Furthermore, they are likely to perceive themselves as more
visible to a range of stakeholders because of their size and

137. The people filling out the questionnaire should generally have had enough
knowledge to remember whether there had been an ACCC investigation in the
previous six years as the median length of years they had spent working in the
organization was six years (with a mean of nine years). It was necessary to go back
six years in order to get enough cases of companies having had ACCC investigations
for statistical manipulation. We use a self-report measure, rather than official ACCC
records of investigation, on the basis that it is more salient to measure those
businesses that actually remember having been investigated by the ACCC.
138. See PARKER & STEPANENKO, supra note 111, at 19-–5.
139. See Parker & Nielsen, Do Businesses Take Compliance Systems Seriously?,
supra note 114, at 464–65.
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reputation.140 It has been widely reported that larger businesses
perceived themselves to be a greater target for ACCC enforcement
action.141 On the other hand, larger firms may also feel less
vulnerable to small amounts of criticism and pressure because of their
size. We measure size by number of employees.
(ii) “Organizational Resources” (Table 8): Similarly,
companies that have greater resources to understand the TPA and
their strategic environment might also have a higher perception of the
risks from various external stakeholders if they breach the TPA.
They should also be in a better position to implement compliance
systems and other management behaviors. The measure combines
four questions that addressed how “well-resourced—either by
contracting out or by using in-house expertise—do you think your
organization is” regarding legal knowledge, economic knowledge,
research and development, and technical knowledge relevant to
compliance.
Table 8. Questions Included in Measure of How Well-Resourced Is the
Respondent Organization
Question: How “well-

Mean Responses for Each

resourced”—either by

Question

contracting out by using inhouse expertise—do you think
your organization is in the
following respects?
Research and development

(Scale from 1–5 ‘Very badly
resourced’ to ‘Very well

Whole Measure

resourced’. 3 = ‘Neither well
nor badly resourced)
3.20

(n=961)

Legal knowledge

3.66

(n=970)

Economic knowledge

3.69

(n=968)

Mean = 3.54
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.78
n = 970
Min. = 1
Max = 5

Technical knowledge relevant to
compliance

3.60

(n=968)

Std. dev. 0.75

140. Research on corporate social responsibility has shown that most of the companies
that have actually changed their CSR behavior are those with highly visible brands
who have experienced specific criticism. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE
46–74 (2006).
141. See Christine Parker & Vibeke L. Nielsen, What Do Australian Businesses
Think of the ACCC and Does It Matter? 22 (University of Melbourne Law School,
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
377,
2007),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365513.
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(iii) “Level of Management Oversight and Planning” (Table 9):
Similarly, we expect firms that are better managed to be more aware
of external stakeholders (and the risks associated with breach in
relation to a range of stakeholders), and also to be in a better position
to manage compliance better.
Table 9. Questions Included in Measure of Level of Management Oversight and
Planning
Mean Responses for
Each Question
Questions

(Scale from 1–5

Whole Measure

‘Strongly disagree’ to
‘Strongly agree’.)
Our senior managers know very well what
is going on in every part of our

Mean = 3.76
3.89

(n=969)

organization.
Our managers give a lot of priority to long
term strategic planning.

Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.64
n = 972
Min. = 1

3.63

(n=972)

Max = 5
Std. dev. 0.72

ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

4/15/2013 5:48 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

342

[Vol. XL

IV. RESULTS
Table 10. Tests of Influence of Profession of Respondent, Risk Analyses, Worries
About Stakeholders (& Other Variables) on Compliance Management Behavior
Compliance

Complaints

Commc’n &

Mgmt. in Practice

Handling

Training

Mgmt. Account’y

Compl. Perf.

& Whistle-

Meas’t &

blowing

Discipline

Control Variables

Size

.08*

.07*

.09*

.08*

.14***

.10***

.11***

.10**

.08*

NS

(2.37)

(2.37)

(2.55)

(2.18)

(4.47)

(3.31)

(3.33)

(2.88)

(2.43)

Resourcs. .32***

.32***

.16***

.16***

.21***

.17***

.20***

.19***

.16***

.15***

(10.54)

(10.18)

(4.45)

(4.49)

(6.62)

(5.46)

(5.90)

(5.49)

(4.68)

(4.32)

Mgmt.

.15***

.15***

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

O’sight

(4.97)

(4.85)

NS

NS

.21***

.18***

.18***

.17***

.18***

.16***

(6.89)

(6.19)

(5.36)

(4.98)

(5.36)

(4.68)

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

Firm History

ACCC

NS

NS

Investig.
Stake-

NS

NS

NS

NS

holder

.10**

.08*

(2.95)

(2.46)

Criticism
Assessment of Detection Risk

ACCC

.18***

.18***

Likelih’d

(5,21)

(4.96)

NS

Third
Parties

ACCC

NS

NS

.17***

.15***

.11**

.11**

NS

NS

NS

(4.58)

(4.09)

(2.78)

(2.62)

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

.16***

.17***

.16***

.17***

.14***

.13***

.09*

.09*

.16***

.17***

(5.32)

(5.60)

(4.57)

(4.80)

(4.64)

(4.39)

(2.58)

(2.62)

(4.73)

(4.93)

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

Severity

Worries About Economic Losses from:

Cons.

NS

NS

Grps./

.08*

NS

-.14*** -.14***
(3.83)

(2.50)

(3.96)

NGOs
Worries About Losing Respect and Esteem of:

Emp’ees
Cons.
Grps./
NGOs

.10***

.10***

.13***

15***

.11***

.13***

(3.50)

(3.34)

(3.74)

(4.38)

(3.55)

(4.44)

NS

NS

NS

NS

.13**

.14***

(3.21)

(3.62)
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NS

NS

NS

NS

Org. in

-.12**

-.10**

(3.49)

(3.16)
NS

343

NS

NS

NS

NS

.10**

.09**

NS

NS

(3.04)

(2.94)

Industry
Share-

.09***

.09***

.09*

.09**

.08*

holders

(3.05)

(2.96)

(2.59)

(2.74)

(2.53)

Person Responsible for Compliance is:

Fin. Off.

#

(7.18)

#

(-1.59)

#

(-9.84)

#

(- 6.50)

#

(-7.39)

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

.16***

#

NS

#

NS

#

.07*

#

.09*

#

.10***

#

.13***

#

.14***

(Constnt)
Bus.
Exec.
Legal
Counsel
Compl.

(4.69)

Off.

(2.48)

Co’y Sec.

#

NS

(2.60)
#

NS

(3.28)
#

NS

(3.74)
#

NS

(4.05)
#

NS

Model
Stats:
N=

798

785

781

777

781

781

801

788

838

826

Adj. R

0.40

0.40

0.21

0.21

0.38

0.39

0.23

0.24

0.17

0.17

F-value

55.10

37.93

20.13

15.36

37.74

33.04

27.14

19.57

22.09

15.18

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

***

2

of full
model

Note: *** = p< .001; ** = p< .005; * = p< .01 (two-tailed). Cell entries are standardized
regression coefficients with the absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.
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Table 11. Tests of Influence of Profession of Respondent (& Other Variables) on
Weighting of Worries and Perceptions of Risk
Worries
About
Econ.

Worries About Losses of Respect and Esteem from:

Losses from:

Consumer
Groups/

Consumer
Employees

NGOs

Groups/
NGOs

Share-

Other Orgs in

holders

Industry

Risk from Likelihood of
Third

ACCC

Parties

Enforcement

Control Variables

Size

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

.14

.13

***

***

(4.54) (4.05)

Resrcs

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

.11

.10

.16

.15

**

**

***

***

(3.16) (2.71) (4.84) (4.28)

Mgmt.

NS

NS

O’sight

.11

.11

.13

.12

.13

.13

.11

.10

.13

.12

**

**

***

**

***

***

**

**

***

***

NS

NS

(3.27) (3.99) (3.71) (3.34) (3.77) (3.77) (3.03) (2.78) (3.76) (3.59)
Firm History

Stake-

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

holder
Criticsm
ACCC

-.11

-.10

.15

.14

.14

.12

***

*

***

***

***

***

(3.20) (2.81) (4.52) (4.21) (4.40) (3.64)
NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

Investig.

.09

NS

*

.14

.12

***

***

(4.39) (3.82)

(2.61)
Person Responsible for Compliance is:

Fin. Off.

#

(8.06)

#

(14.44)

#

(9.65)

#

(13.4) NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

NS

#

(3.75)

#

(14.11)

NS

NS

#

NS

#

NS

NS

NS

#

.12

#

.11

(Cnstnt)
Bus.
Exec.
Legal
Counsel

**

**

(2.94)

(3.15)

Compl.
Off.

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

NS

NS

#

NS

#

NS
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#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

#

NS

NS

NS

#

NS

#

NS

891

878

945

932

0.09

0.13

0.13

Sec.
Model
stat’s:
N=

920

907

936

922

933

919

907

893

935

921

Adj. R

0.01

0.02 0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.03

0.03

0.02

0.03

0.08

F-value

3.01

2.79 4.96

3.40

3.82

3.07

6.82

3.96

5.42

3.59

16.75 10.55 29.13 16.85

***

***

**

***

***

***

***

2

of full

**

***

***

***

***

***

model
Note: *** = p< .001; ** = p< .005; * = p< .01 (two-tailed). Cell entries are standardized
regression coefficients with the absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.

The regressions shown in Tables 10 and 11 test whether the
profession of the respondent—the person responsible for compliance
within the firm—has an effect on compliance management behavior
directly (Hypothesis 1) or indirectly (Hypothesis 2). Each Table
shows a number of regressions because we use a number of
dependent variables to measure compliance management behavior
(Table 10) and analyses of risk of non-compliance (Table 11). In each
case, as mentioned above, two models are tested with and without the
profession of the respondent in order to test whether inclusion of the
profession adds anything to the explanation or not. The test of the
model that includes the profession of the person responsible for
compliance is on the right and in bold for each pair of regressions for
each dependent variable.
A. Hypothesis 1: Direct Effects of Professional Orientation on
Compliance Management Behaviors
We hypothesized first that compliance management behaviors will
differ between firms that have individuals from different professions
in charge of compliance. Table 10 shows there is in fact little
evidence of any direct effect of profession on any of our dependent
variables measuring formal compliance system implementation and
substantive compliance management. The R-squares for each pair of
regressions for each of the five dependent variables remains the same,
or improves only very slightly, when we include the profession of the
person responsible for compliance into the model. This suggests that
profession does not add much, if anything, to the explanation.
Moreover, when profession is included in the regressions, except for
compliance officers, it is rarely significant.
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Hypothesis 1A: The profession of the “individual in charge of
compliance” will make for differences between firms in the formal
compliance system elements that they are reported to have
implemented.
Table 10 shows that if the profession of the respondent was finance
officer, business executive, or company secretary, such profession had
no significant effect on the formal compliance system elements
reported as being implemented. For firms with legal counsel or,
particularly, compliance officer respondents, the implementation of
more formal compliance system elements was reported. If the person
responsible for compliance is a legal counsel, this is only true for
“communication and training” elements of compliance systems. But
where it is a compliance officer, the organization is significantly more
likely to have put in place each of the elements of formal compliance
systems.
“Communication and training” elements include the
presence of manuals and training programs about the Act.
In the set of equations reported in Table 10, including the
profession of the person responsible for compliance in the model
makes no dramatic changes in the regression equation factors except
in relation to two variables: (1) when profession is included the
implementation of “communication and training” elements of
compliance systems is not significantly related to worries about losing
the respect and esteem of shareholders; (2) similarly, worries about
economic losses from consumer groups/NGOs drops out of the
explanation for implementation of “complaints handling” elements of
compliance systems when profession is included in the model. In
both cases, however, having a compliance officer responsible for
compliance is significantly associated with implementation of the
relevant compliance system element. In the case of worries about
shareholders and implementation of the communication and training
elements of compliance systems, having a legal counsel responsible
for compliance is also significant. These findings suggest that the
professional orientation of the person responsible for compliance is
responsible for the reported worries about economic losses from
consumer groups or NGOs and losses of esteem of shareholders.
Hypothesis 1B: The occupational/professional background of the

“individual in charge of compliance” will make for differences
between firms in their substantive compliance management
behaviors.
Table 10 shows that having a compliance officer responsible for
compliance is the only professional orientation that is significantly
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associated with compliance management in practice, but that
association is fairly weak.
In Table 10, we also test for the influence of firms’ risk analyses on
compliance management behaviors.142 Worries about the reactions of
employees and shareholders to non-compliance most consistently
factor into implementation of both formal and more substantive
compliance management behaviors. In both cases it is losses of
respect and esteem, not economic losses, that have an effect.
We also find that worries about both economic losses and social
losses from consumer groups or NGOs relate to implementation of
communication and training elements of formal compliance systems.
Worries about economic losses from consumer groups or NGOs are
also weakly significant for implementation of complaints handling
systems. Finally, worries about losses of respect and esteem from
“other organizations in your industry” are significantly associated
with lower implementation of communication and training elements
of formal compliance systems.143
It is these worries that actually impact on compliance management
behavior. Thus we hypothesize (Hypothesis 2) that it is by
influencing the perceptions of these risks that the profession of the
person in charge of compliance has an indirect effect on the firm’s
compliance behaviors. We test this hypothesis in Table 11 (discussed
below).
Compliance management behavior is also significantly influenced
by the likelihood of ACCC enforcement and likelihood of complaint
from third parties. Consequently, to test Hypothesis 2, we also need
to know to what extent these assessments of risk are influenced by the
profession of the respondent.

142. Because of the significance of perception of risk of complaint by third parties in the
results of these analyses (and the lack of significance of worries about economic and social
losses in relation to the various third parties), we also made the same analyses again
excluding the perception of risk of complaints from third parties to check whether this had
been masking the significance of worries about third parties. This made no difference to the
significance of worries about third parties. Similarly, we also made the regression stepwise with ACCC investigation added as an independent variable last in case it was
masking the influence of third parties. This also made no difference to the results.
143. These findings have been discussed at greater length in separate papers on
data from the same survey published previously by two of the co-authors of the
current Article. See generally Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties, supra note 96; Parker
& Nielsen, How Much Does It Hurt?, supra note 96.
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Hypothesis 2: Indirect Effect of Profession on Risk Analyses

We have seen in the discussion of the results in Table 10 above that
professional orientation has little direct effect on compliance
management behaviors. We also have seen that firms’ risk analyses
have some influence on compliance management behavior. Table 11
shows the results of tests to determine whether the profession of the
person responsible for compliance has an indirect effect on
compliance management behavior by influencing the way in which
the firm is reported to analyze the risks of non-compliance and to be
worried about different stakeholders. To do this we used a series of
regressions (shown in Table 11) to test the influence of the profession
of the person responsible for compliance on each of the worries and
risk analysis variables that turned out to have a significant influence
on compliance management behavior (as shown in Table 10). We
also include the same control variables as for the regressions in Table
10.
Again we conducted two regressions for each dependent variable
comparing the power of the explanation with and without including
the profession of the respondent in the analysis. Once again, as Table
11 shows, adding the professional or occupational background of the
person responsible for compliance to the explanatory model does not
improve the R-squares for each of the regressions, or makes them
only very slightly higher. This means that including the profession of
the person responsible for compliance to the model does not add
much to the explanation.

Hypothesis 2A: The professional background of the “individual in
charge of compliance” will make for differences between firms in
their reported concern about the loss of esteem by and economic
sanctions from various stakeholders.
We find no evidence that the profession of the person responsible
for compliance makes any significant difference at all to the weighting

(or valuation) of worries about economic and social losses in relation
to different stakeholders if the organization were to breach the TPA
at some point in the future. We only examine the worries that we
found to make a difference to compliance management behavior in
Table 10. The R-squares for the regressions seeking to explain
variation in worries about the various stakeholders are very poor
(0.01–0.03)—suggesting that there are other things explaining this
variation that we have not captured in our model. We do, however,
find that one of our control variables, management oversight and
planning, makes a significant difference to most of these worries.
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This suggests that there may be something about the management
style of a firm that leads to it worrying more about stakeholder
reactions to non-compliance, but our model is not powerful enough to
draw further conclusions about this.144
Hypothesis 2B: The professional background of the “individual in

charge of compliance” will make for differences between firms in
their assessments of the risks of (i) stakeholders and (ii) regulators
detecting non-compliance.
Where the person responsible for compliance in the firm is a
lawyer, the firm is significantly more likely to perceive both a higher
risk of complaint from third parties about TPA compliance issues and
a higher likelihood and severity of ACCC enforcement action. Apart
from this finding, the profession of the person responsible for
compliance does not make any significant difference to the way firms

assess the more immediate risk from stakeholders and the regulator
in relation to TPA compliance.
As we would expect, those organizations that had experienced
actual criticism from stakeholders in relation to TPA compliance in
the past also see the likelihood of further pressure from both third
parties and the regulator as higher. This was true regardless of
whether the person responsible for compliance was included in the
model or not. This fits well with general observations that people
estimate the risk of something they know and see as immediate as
higher than something they do not know or have not experienced
before, regardless of true probabilities.145
Those organizations that have experienced an ACCC investigation
in the past also see the likelihood of further regulatory enforcement
action as well as complaints from third parties as higher (and we saw
above that these worries do influence implementation of compliance
management behaviors). But, this changes when we include the
person responsible for compliance in the explanatory model: the fact

144. For further discussion of the importance of management oversight and
planning (or long term management approach, as we sometimes label this variable)
throughout our analyses of these survey data, see generally Parker & Nielsen, supra
note 95; Parker & Nielsen, How Much Does it Hurt?, supra note 96.
145. See generally MARTIN FISHBEIN & ICEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE,
INTENTION, AND BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH (1975);
JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW DECISIONS HAPPEN (1994);
Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 173 (2004).
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that a lawyer is responsible for the firm’s compliance is significantly
related to perceptions of the risk of third party and regulator action
on non-compliance, and the significance of the ACCC having
investigated the firm in the past drops out of the equation.
This probably reflects the fact that lawyers are likely to be made
the person responsible for TPA compliance after a firm has
experienced an ACCC investigation. In this Article, we do not seek
to explain why firms select persons of particular professional
backgrounds to be the person responsible for compliance.146 But we
do know from analysis of our data that the size of the firm and
whether it has had contact with or has been investigated by the
ACCC in the past, is significant in explaining whether a lawyer is the
person responsible for compliance.147 An organization that has had an
ACCC investigation is more likely to have put a lawyer in charge of
TPA compliance (at some stage—we do not know when—but it may
well have been in response to the investigation), and that lawyer will
assess the risk of future ACCC enforcement actions and third party
complaints as significantly higher than people with other professional
orientations in other organizations.

146. For a discussion of this topic, see Deepak K. Datta & James P. Guthrie,
Organizational Antecedents of CEO Characteristics, 15
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 569 (1994).
147. See infra Table 12.

Executive Succession:

ROSEN ET AL_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

4/15/2013 5:48 PM

2012] FRAMING EFFECTS OF PROFESSIONALISM

351

Table 12. Lawyers More Likely to be Responsible for Compliance Where Firm
Has Had ACCC Investigation
Respondent Is a Law
Independent Variables

Size

Professional
.58***

Industry
1. Primary Industries

.34

2. Manufacturing & Construction

.29

3. Wholesale Trade

.01

4. Retail & Hospitality

-.22

5. Fin. & Ins., Property & Bus. Servs., Transport & Storage

.29

6. Government & Essential Services

-.01

7. Education & Other Services

.01

Admit breach (No = 0, Yes = 1)

.09

Investigated by the ACCC (No = 0, Yes = 1)

.82*

Interaction with the ACCC (No = 0, Yes = 1)

.97***

Level of experienced criticism

.31

Model statistics:
2

N = Naglekerke’s R

919

F-value of full model

.23***

Note: *** = p< .001; ** = p< .005; * = p< .01 (two-tailed). Cell entries are B-coefficients

Control Variables: We also find that larger and better-resourced
firms are significantly more likely to perceive the risk of ACCC
enforcement and third party complaints as higher. As mentioned in
our discussion of our hypotheses, this is probably because larger firms
see themselves as a larger target. It may also be because they have
more resources to be aware of the risk.148

148. See Parker & Nielson, How Much Does It Hurt?, supra note 96, at 597.
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V. DISCUSSION
A. Summary of Results
We hypothesized that firm compliance behavior was responsive to
the professional background of the person responsible for compliance
in two interrelated ways—directly and indirectly.
Directly, we expected that the profession of the respondent would
lead to reporting different levels of implementation of formal
compliance systems and different substantive compliance
management practices. We thought we would find this result for
three different reasons.
First, we had several accounts of professional framing. Because
different professions have different norms and heuristics, we
hypothesized that compliance departments led by members of
different professions would operate differently. Or, because different
professions have different cognitive structures, for respondents from
different professions, different factors would be salient and more
likely to be reported.
Second, we expected that the selection of a particular profession to
lead compliance might reflect something about the firm. These
differences would be reported back to us by the different
professionals.
Third, to the extent that there is subjectivity in the responses to our
survey, the subjectivity would lead to the display of that which is
normatively desirable in the respondent’s profession. Or, the
subjectivity might lead to more instrumental responses, justifying
their profession’s cast of mind as appropriate for management of the
compliance function.
We also expected an indirect influence of the respondent’s
profession by influencing the firm’s identity and values in relation to
its environment and therefore its compliance management behavior.
We hypothesized that the professional background of the individual
inside the firm who was in charge of compliance would influence the
firm to weigh the risk of stakeholder reactions to non-compliance
differently, and that this in turn would lead them to put in place
different compliance management behaviors.
Overall, we found little evidence of either direct or indirect
influence. The main effects of professional orientation we found
were that having a compliance officer in charge of compliance leads
to a direct effect on both implementation of formal compliance
systems and also more substantive compliance management
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behaviors. Having a lawyer in charge of compliance leads to a direct
effect on only one aspect of formal compliance system
implementation: communication and training elements. Having a
lawyer in charge also has an effect on implementation of both formal
compliance system elements and substantive compliance management
through the lawyer’s influence on the firm’s increased perception of
risk from third parties and the regulator.
Those who are in charge of compliance who identify as compliance
specialists are more likely to make sure that the organization
implements more fulsome compliance systems. This is hardly
surprising given the compliance profession specializes in putting
compliance structures in place in an organization. We might have
thought, given the professional rhetoric of compliance officers, that
the structures they have in place would also be more likely to
translate to substantively better compliance management in practice.
Although our evidence is consistent with this expectation, it is not as
dramatic as we, and compliance specialists, might have wished.
We find no direct relation between having a lawyer in charge of
compliance and there being complaint handling mechanisms within
the firm. Neither do we find any relation between putting a lawyer in
charge of compliance and increased management accountability and
whistle-blowing mechanisms. Further, we do not find any relation
between having a lawyer in charge of compliance and the firm
measuring compliance and disciplining non-compliance. By contrast,
having a designated compliance manager in charge of compliance
leads to all of these structures promoting compliance and punishing
non-compliance.
We do not find that having a lawyer in charge of compliance has
any effect on compliance management in practice. Items such as
“Compliance failures are always investigated” or “Managers in our
organization know what aspects of compliance they are responsible
for” are not reported more (or less) often by lawyer respondents than
non-lawyer respondents. Table 10 shows that having a compliance
officer responsible for compliance is the only professional orientation
that is significantly associated with compliance management in
practice, but that association is fairly weak.149 This suggests that the
compliance system elements introduced by legal counsel and
compliance officers may be purely formal, even symbolic. Lawyers
and compliance officers might find it important to make the symbolic

149. See supra Table 10.
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and formal efforts of making a compliance system, but this does not
necessarily mean it makes any difference in compliance practice.
We do find that lawyers are more likely to report that their firm
has a greater likelihood of regulatory enforcement and a greater
likelihood of complaints (suits) by third parties about regulatory
breaches. That is, lawyers see the firm as more legally exposed.
These measurements of risk do have an impact on firm structure and
behavior. We therefore find an indication of some sort of cycle of
legal risk or legalization in which the experience of a close shave with
the ACCC might mean an organization puts a lawyer in charge of
TPA compliance and the lawyer maintains a constant perception of a
high risk from the ACCC and other third parties in relation to TPA
non-compliance.
This does not, however, seem to play out into any sort of different
thinking by the lawyer regarding the economic and social value of
different stakeholders for the organization, and how that might affect
the organization’s compliance activities. Nor does it play out in
changing commitments to compliance. Its result appears only to
increase the likelihood that the firm will have written policies,
manuals, and training programs.
Overall it is the perception of risk of discovery of non-compliance
by third parties and the government, rather than the profession (and
presumably the values or ideology) of the person responsible for
compliance that makes a difference in what the businesses do about
compliance according to our data.150 Experience of actual coercive
pressure from stakeholders (i.e., ACCC investigation and, to a lesser
extent, experienced criticism by third parties and the perception of
risk of loss from stakeholders) are very important for compliance
behavior both directly (Table 10) and also indirectly through
influence on the way risks are perceived (Table 11).151 Including the
profession of the person responsible for compliance in our models
makes little difference. This suggests that a history of noncompliance detection—through third party criticism and ACCC
investigation—and associated heightened perceptions of risk for the
future, have a direct impact on firm thinking about risks of noncompliance and that is not necessarily mediated through the
professional orientation of the person responsible for compliance.
150. Note that it is risk of discovery that is explanatory rather than reported
worries about loss of respect or esteem or economic losses from stakeholders.
151. We have discussed this finding in greater depth in another paper based on the
same data. See Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties, supra note 96, at 329–38.
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Limitations of Study

There are some potential limitations on the general application of
our data, which suggest further research in this area should be
undertaken. We found a lack of permeation of norms/stakeholder
concerns into the firm via the profession of the person responsible for
compliance. This may be because the area of compliance we are
looking at (competition and consumer protection law) is simply not
an area where there are clear social norms with which any particular
professional group clearly identifies.152 It might have been different if
we had looked at firms’ occupational health and safety compliance
and compared firms with safety engineers, lawyers, and business
executives in charge of compliance.
It may simply be that the knowledge of how to stimulate and
monitor compliance may not be part of the lawyerly cast of mind.
Compliance may require organizational skills, which may not be part
of what a lawyer’s practice or socialization develops. It may simply
be that the legal profession has no interest in claiming jurisdiction
over compliance jobs, despite the fact that we are speaking of
compliance with the law.
Moreover, our model of how legal norms become embedded within
firms makes a number of assumptions. First, it assumes that the
interests of the “individual in charge of compliance” derive from their
occupational/professional background. Second, it assumes that “the
individual in charge of compliance” has the capacity to direct
corporate behaviors.
Our model, however, is not dependent on a restricted view of
power or agency. We are taking the selection of a compliance leader
as a proxy for understanding cognitive and social processes within the
organization.153 For example, we recognize that in examining only the
professional role of the person in charge of compliance, we are eliding
that decision-making often is the product of a team154 and occurs

152. The competition policy side of the Australian TPA may be particularly
ambiguous in its level of professional and political support. See generally Fiona
Haines & Caron Beaton-Wells, Ambiguities in Criminalizing Cartels: A Political
Economy, 52 BRIT. J. CRIM. 953 (2012); Christine Parker, Economic Rationalities of
Governance and Ambiguity in the Criminalization of Cartels, 52 BRIT. J. CRIM. 974,
974 (2012).
153. See generally Mason A. Carpenter et al., Upper Echelons Research Revisited:
Antecedents, Elements, and Consequences of Top Management Team Composition,
30 J. MGMT. 749 (2004).
154. See Hambrick & Mason, supra note 63, at 202.
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within a political structure.155 Although we often speak about the
consequences of having a certain type of leader, we are not wedded to
an anthropocentric model of a leader deciding. Instead, we are
adopting a shorthand to describe corporate processes. Behind our
model is the more general claim that differences between firms are
revealed by or result from the occupational/professional identity of
the person in charge of compliance.
We also have assumed that our categorization of the respondents
into different professions and functional backgrounds is accurate. We
do not know the educational training of our respondents. We do not
know how long they practiced law or whether they are the CFO now,
but were the CLO last year. We did not ask these questions in our
survey because its focus was on compliance, not professionalism.
Nonetheless, we are rather confident that all those we coded as
lawyers are legally trained and have practice experience. That army
of 181, all of whom claim a lawyer identity, does not appear to be
standing on the machinery of justice or at the outposts of the legal
profession.156
With the exception of CEOs who may have emerged from sales or
product development, all of our respondents have what has been
termed “throughput experiences.”157
Administration, law, and
accounting are classified as “throughput functions” and hence, our
data may confirm those who claim that it is “output” versus
“throughput” experience that divides managers.
The lack of
environmental scanning responsibilities, however, is what
distinguishes throughput experiences.158 Our respondents did scan the
environment since external risks are central to the compliance
function, and they perceived the environment differently. There is
sizable variation in their responses, but we have not by our analyses
in this Article explained the variation. Except as we have explained,
their professional background and their company’s compliance
behaviors were not linked to their scanning.
Finally, these findings may suffer from the problem of reverse
causality159: because the firm wanted manuals and internal training

155. See generally James G. March, The Business Firm as a Political Coalition, 24
J. POL. 662 (1962).
156. See supra note 1.
157. See supra note 63.
158. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
159. See Barker & Mueller, supra note 16, at 795 (“What is the causal nature of the
relationships we have found between CEO characteristics and R&D spending?
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programs, it hired lawyers. Because the firm desired robust formal
compliance systems, they hired compliance experts. Given the
limitations of our data, we have no way to determine causality.
C.

Firm Identity and the Profession of the Person in Charge of
Compliance

In determining the salience of different stakeholders, and the
pressures they can bring to bear, a firm makes choices about its
identity. We hypothesized that compliance departments headed by
members of different professions would worry about economic and
esteem losses from different stakeholders. By influencing the
company’s perceptions of the risks of non-compliance, the
professional would indirectly influence compliance behavior.
Our respondents were surveyed about ten stakeholders who could
impose economic losses on the firm and thirteen stakeholders whose
esteem for the firm might be damaged should the firm be accused of
TPA breaches.
There is a fair amount of variation in the
respondents’ ratings of their worries about different stakeholders and
from stakeholder to stakeholder.160
Yet, contrary to our hypotheses, we find no evidence that the
profession of the person responsible for compliance makes a
difference to the firm’s perception of the risks of non-compliance in
relation to these different stakeholders. To the extent that people
responsible for compliance have different values and norms in
relation to how the firm should value different stakeholders, this does
not appear to track professional identity.
The cognitive
distinctiveness of the different professions is blanched out in intrafirm processes. Although the professionals inside the corporation are
known as “boundary-spanning” personnel, we find no evidence that
the professionals responsible for compliance cause the firm to focus
on either the economic or social good will of particular external
stakeholders. It is not the person in charge of compliance who
coordinates or controls the firm’s perception of its stakeholders.

Because we lack longitudinal data, we cannot tell how stable the relationships are
across time. This limitation also means that . . . there is the possibility of reverse
causality. For example, it could be that firms spending large amounts on R&D look
for CEO candidates with R&D or marketing career experience.”); Chaganti &
Sambharya, supra note 68, at 396; Datta & Guthrie, supra note 146, at 574; Smith &
White, supra note 68, at 271 (finding relationship between firm’s previous strategy
and successor’s functional background); Thomas et al., supra note 68, at 514–20.
160. See supra Table 4.
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We often think of implementation of compliance systems, including
complaint handling systems, as directed at convincing external
stakeholders, like customers, that an organization is doing the right
thing. But our results suggest that internal stakeholders (employees)
are in some ways a more important “audience” for compliance
management activities than many external stakeholders. In Table 10,
worries about losing the respect and esteem of employees was
significantly associated with increased implementation of the basic
aspects of formal compliance structures and also compliance
management in practice. This may be because senior managers
understand that by definition, employees are keeping a “close eye”
on compliance from the inside, and risk of detection is what motivates
compliance practices.161
The second part of risk analysis is the measurement of the risk of
loss, in this case from the detection of noncompliance. We also find,
with one exception, no evidence of professional orientation making a
difference to this component of risk analysis. Our data suggests that
risk analysis within the firm must be controlled by other norms
regarding both the legal and non-legal enforceability of compliance.
The sole exception concerns lawyers. Although lawyers do not
differently weigh the types and magnitudes of losses from noncompliance, they are more likely to perceive that both the regulator
and third parties would detect noncompliance. This finding may
support the position of those who argue that lawyers tend to overstate
legal risks.162 The lawyer cast of mind may induce lawyers to be
lightning-rod salesmen of charged conflict.
Unfortunately, the causal direction is not clear. It might equally be
the other way around—that those firms that do in fact have a higher
risk of detection and enforcement of this area of law by the regulator
or third parties are more likely to have a lawyer in charge of
compliance. Researchers of compliance in other areas of law have
found that compliance managers are more likely than lawyers to
overstate legal risks.163
Others have shown that compliance
structures, especially those adopted in response to overstated risks,

161. We have discussed this in more detail in another paper focusing on other
aspects of our data. See Nielsen & Parker, Third Parties, supra note 96, at 337.
162. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the
Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
375, 379–80 (1997).
163. See, e.g., Edelman et al., Professional Construction, supra note 65, at 80. This
finding is discussed further below at text accompanying note 181.
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divert the firm from concern with noncompliance, offering formal
compliance instead of a changed workplace.164
Our findings would support these conclusions. What our findings
add is the independence of perceptions of risk of loss from the
perceptions of the magnitude of loss. Although lawyers may
overstate risk, the definition of the situation—how and why noncompliance is worrisome—does not change. Our data would predict
that when lawyers lead compliance programs, firms will introduce
measures that reduce the risk of loss but that the firm will not
experience change in its understandings of the significance of
noncompliance or the value of compliance.
We see more evidence here of businesses pragmatically responding
to focused application of stakeholder pressure than of businesses
responding in a principled way to their assessment of stakeholder
values and concerns. This is reflected in the fact that greater
normative commitment to compliance is correlated to the perception
of being watched, rather than worries about economic losses or losses
of respect and esteem.
Obedience to the law when one is not being monitored
distinguishes mere compliance with the law from “willing acceptance
of the law.”165 In these terms, we find that the person in charge of
compliance reports that the firm has not accepted the law. We do not
find a “compliance norm,” or “norm of law abidingness” that “should
elicit compliance even where the firm’s activity is shielded from the
regulator’s gaze.”166
D. Firm Norms and Professional Behavior
We have found that neither direct nor indirect influences of
professional orientation are very good at explaining compliance
164. See generally Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin Talesh, To Comply or Not to
Comply—That Isn’t the Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of
Compliance, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 103
(Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011); Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace,
27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 499–500 (1993); Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity, supra
note 100, at 75; Gilad, supra note 120, at 326–27; Carol A. Heimer, Competing
Institutions: Law, Medicine, and Family in Neonatal Intensive Care, 33 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 17 (1999).
165. Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in
Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287,
1292 (2005).
166. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV.
451, 455 (2003) (citations omitted).
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behavior and that there is no evidence that the person in charge of
compliance mediates the influence of stakeholders. Instead, we are
led to infer that there are firm-level (non-legally enforceable) norms
that determine compliance behavior.
Firms have compliance
cultures167 and their norms restrain the exercise of professional
judgment. The person in charge of compliance abides by these
norms.
This contradicts our model, which had depicted professional norms
as shaping firm behavior. Our model suggested that the person in
charge of compliance might defect from other firm norms. Judged
from the perspective of the firm, such defections are costly, both in
terms of morale and future cooperation.168 Thus, it is not surprising
that we find evidence that firms must have informal governance
mechanisms that inhibit such defections. Finding that the persons in
charge of compliance are guided by firm—not professional—norms, is
consistent with recognizing that they have been “promoted” to this
position and have been rewarded for subscribing to firm norms.169
On the other hand, in choosing professionals, whether they are
financial, legal, compliance, or the company secretary, to lead
compliance, the firm signals that it has incorporated external norms
into its decision-making. It signals that compliance with law extends
beyond ordinary managerial decision-making. Despite these signals,
however, we find that the firm integrates professional norms in a
manner that is least disruptive to the internal workings of the
organization.170
The governance structure that our results reveal makes action in
the firm relatively impermeable to social pressures. It does not
include professional norms in its definition of the situation. It also
does not especially include the environment to which the professional
is responsive. Even though firm interests sometimes will support
professional ones, such as when internal whistle-blowing deters

167. Rosen, Diffusion, supra note 18, at 1289.
168. See Roderick M. Kramer, Trust and Distrust in Organizations: Emerging
Perspectives, Enduring Questions, 50 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 569, 592 (1999); see also
Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames and
Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 687 (1999).
169. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from

the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the
Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 302-03 (2004) (noting as well that the
promoted actor may conceal “the inclination to defect when necessary”).
170. See Bamberger, supra note 24, at 428.
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potentially expensive misconduct,171 the relative impermeability of the
firm to professional and social norms supports unlawful behavior, as
decision-making is unmoored from social interests.172 The insularity
of the firm is attested to by our findings that concerns about reactions
from employees, not external others, best predicts compliance
behavior.
We find that firms do not allocate formal compliance resources in a
manner consistent with their risk analyses. Given this result, we
suspect that the additional formal compliance elements that are
implemented when lawyers and compliance officers are in charge of
compliance are side-payments to them. Consequently, the firm’s
implementation of formal compliance elements may be the result of
rent-seeking behavior by those in charge of compliance.
On the other hand, a company that hires a compliance manager to
run a compliance system may know that they are buying a compliance
system with more elements. If they hire a lawyer, they may know that
they are buying manuals and training programs. These come along
with lawyers as standard equipment that cannot be refused.173 Firms
may choose to contract with these agents, incurring these costs in
exchange for more valuable benefits.
Firms may hire compliance experts or lawyers (or other
professionals) to reduce the costs of monitoring these managers. But,
they find that this will result in increased expenses for formal
compliance elements. These expenses may serve as signals to
outsiders of compliance, even if they are mere window dressing.
These expenses also serve as signals to the person in charge of

171. Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of
Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1187, 1212 (2003).
172. See Diane Vaughan, Toward Understanding Unlawful Organizational
Behavior, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1377, 1391 (1982).
173. “[L]egal compliance professionals have an incentive to recommend means of
containing legal risk or legal ambiguity that require substantial involvement by legal
compliance professions and fall squarely within their area of expertise such as . . .
employee manuals, or . . . requiring certain types of employee training.” Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 487, 529–30 (2003).
Producing manuals and conducting training programs at the organizational
level enables corporations to assign blame to employees who failed to
follow the lessons . . . [and] shift liability away form the corporation or
board. . . . This can occur even if the manuals and programs are weakly
calibrated to promote actual substantive performance.
Cunningham, supra note 22, at 314.
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compliance of the firm’s commitment to her. Our data suggest that
they substitute for firm commitments to legal values.
This explanation is consistent with our very strong findings that
compliance behavior is responsive to organizational size and
resources. This suggests that to understand compliance behavior, one
must examine not only the risks to which the organization is subject,
but also “organizational slack,” how uncommitted managerial
resources are accumulated and distributed in the firm.174 Formal
compliance systems may be investments in binding the person in
charge of compliance to the firm, paid for by using organizational
slack.
E.

The Two Faces of Lawyers

In a prior analysis of data from the same survey,175 we sought to
determine what effect lawyers had on clients. We found that lawyers
often reinforced client commitments to legal compliance. Clients,
however, differed in their attitudes to compliance and their lawyers
followed their clients’ lead. We found that there was “evidence that
lawyers (and compliance officers) do more to implement compliance
systems, improve knowledge and understanding of compliance and
monitoring of compliance within the organization than where others
are in charge of compliance.”176 Yet, lawyers draw back from
changing client normative commitments to compliance.
They
contribute technical information and means.
We also found that when “[l]awyers are charged with being overly
adversarial, putting stumbling blocks in the path of regulation,
instigating clients not to comply with regulators, and souring relations
between their clients and regulators,” they often do so in response to
client demands, not as part of their professional cast of mind.177

174. See generally L.J. Bourgeois, III, On the Measurement of Organizational
Slack, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 29, 31 (1981). Organizational slack, when it is not
described as inefficient, has been said to serve four different functions: (1) it can be
used to bind members to the firm; (2) it can be used for conflict resolution; (3) it can
be used to manage workflow, and (4) it can be deployed for expanding the adaptive
capacities of the firm. See generally Mark P. Sharfman et al., Antecedents of
Organizational Slack, 13 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 601 (1988).
175. See generally Christine Parker, Richard Eli Rosen & Vibeke L. Nielsen, The

Two Faces of Lawyers: Professional Ethics and Business Compliance with
Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 201 (2009).
176. See id. at 238.
177. See id. at 239.
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On the other hand, we did find that lawyers lead clients to “gameplaying.” We asked the respondents to scale whether a “wise
organization uses the loopholes in the law” and whether “my
organization spends time and resources figuring out how to get what
we want without directly breaching” the regulations. Even in firms
committed to compliance, some lawyers adopted this game-playing
attitude, leading clients to non-compliance.178
We concluded that the dichotomy of professional versus nonprofessional failed to take into account both the determining effects
of clients who are committed to compliance and that lawyers
“negotiate with themselves and the profession over the character of
professionalism in the law.”179 When clients are committed to
compliance, lawyers can create a virtuous cycle, unless the lawyer
understands game-playing to be part of the professional cast of mind.
In this Article, we find only two possible components of a lawyer
cast of mind. First, lawyers may put in place paper compliance
systems, like manuals, and training programs: these do not change the
normative orientation of the client toward compliance. Paper
compliance systems are consistent with our earlier finding of lawyers
as engaged in game-playing.180 Lawyers may assume an identity as
window-dressers prettifying the firm for the regulator without
improving compliance.
Second, we find that lawyers stress the likelihood of litigation,
either private or public. This finding depicts lawyers as lightning-rod
salesmen, stressing that precautions should be taken because “you
should be frightened.” The problem is that we do not find that the
firms take substantive precautions in response to this fear mongering.
In our findings, lawyers more than compliance officers stressed the
risk of litigation. In Edelman’s research on affirmative action, she
found that human resource officers were more likely than lawyers to
stress the risk of litigation, even distorting cases to increase the
perceived risk.181 She explained that these human resource officers
were in competition with lawyers and depicted the legal environment
as a risky one in order to support their claims to corporate power.182
As in Edelman’s work, in our research, compliance managers and
lawyers may be in conflict over who should be in charge of TPA
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See id. at 240.
Id.
Id. at 241.
See Edelman et al., supra note 65, at 72–73.
See id. at 76.
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compliance. This work suggests that stressing the risk of litigation is
instrumental.183 By stressing the risk of litigation, our lawyers are
competing for power within the firm. Rather than the lightning-rod
salesperson being part of the lawyer cast of mind, it may be a persona
that lawyers, like Edelman’s human resources personnel, adopt when
it suits their instrumental needs. But, as our data shows, when
lawyers gain power they use it only to window-dress the firm.
Donald Langevoort has suggested that the “emerging ethics and
compliance industry . . . promot[e] their own professional autonomy”
by claiming that “there is something in the language, training,
socialization, personality and/or professional identity of lawyers that
has this effect, . . . that lawyers predictably frustrate focus on ethics
beyond minimal legal compliance.”184 In particular, he wonders
whether the lawyer cast of mind obscures differences between “a
‘paper program’ . . . and one that actually drives desired behavior in a
meaningful way.”185 Our data defends lawyers because they are
lightning-rod salespeople, stressing the risk of detection. More
important, our good news is that the emerging ethics and compliance
profession is similarly afflicted by the charges they cast against
lawyers.
CONCLUSION: BACK TO JULIUS HENRY COHEN
Cohen knew the lawyer cast of mind as an acquired virtue,
particularly frail and subject to counter-socialization.186
He
campaigned against business entering the profession.187 Here, we
have the profession entering business, and our results suggest that the
lawyer cast of mind is subject to dissolution: business (or firm) norms
displace professional ones.
Cohen also knew “thinking like a lawyer” to be an aspect of
professional identity that created “we lawyers.”188 Our findings here,
consistent with what we found previously,189 suggest that lawyers,
even those who occupy the same position within companies, are too
diverse to produce strong results when analyzed as a group. Lawyers
are not a “we” who can be organized toward particular ends or whose
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See id. at 73.
See Langevoort, supra note 18, at 518.
See id. at 501.
See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
See generally Parker et al., supra note 175, at 238–41.
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individual moral character can be ignored. We do not find a shared
vision of to whom a company answers or what should be a company’s
attitude towards complying with the law.
Lawyers as a collective can also mobilize to claim the right to solve
problems, to occupy certain positions, and to make jurisdictional
claims. Lawyers might be able to argue that they should be the ones
to teach company managers what regulation requires and what
compliance entails. We find no evidence that lawyers are mobilizing
to gain compliance jobs. Our data finds that only 18% of those in
charge of compliance were lawyers. Despite the tight relation
between compliance and legal regulation and the hoped for relation
between legal controls and social reform, lawyers may not be more
suitable than others to lead compliance departments. Despite the
need of young lawyers, at least, to find non-distinctively legal jobs as
traditional legal jobs face closure, lawyers claim no special ability to
diagnose, analyze, or remedy compliance issues.
Our findings are consistent with a lawyer cast of mind developing
particularly well an individual’s communication skills. According to
our data, when a company employs someone with a legal background
as manager of compliance, it is buying training manuals, educational
programs, and warnings about the prospect of legal sanction. This is
consistent with a prior study of individuals who took their legal
degrees and went into management, who report that law school
served them well by developing their communication skills.190 Legal
writing and oral advocacy are traditional lawyer skills and lawyers
take these into compliance when they write manuals and train
employees.
Generally, however, we find a lack of evidence of the influence of a
lawyer cast of mind in compliance management. To conclude with
just one area where having a lawyer in charge of compliance appears
to make no difference: there is no evidence that employing a lawyer
to be in charge of compliance leads to increased hot lines and other
whistle-blowing possibilities. Lawyers are still not involved in
“mending the information net.”191 Lawyers still do not see their job as
improving decision-making.192 The ball is still in the business
manager’s court, to decide how to play the game after receiving the
190. Robert Eli Rosen, Educating Law Students to be Business Leaders, 9 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 27 (2002).
191. CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY: LAW AND ETHICS 199
(1975).
192. See generally Rosen, supra note 18.
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lawyers’ manuals and sitting through the seminars offered by the
lawyers.
Cohen’s idealization of the profession is not unique. Many have
valued professions as a cultural tradition that permits new ideas and
skills to emerge and mature.193 The ability of professions to enter
situations and remake them, bringing the weight of culture and a
profound skill set, has often been lauded—not least by the
professions themselves, who have an economic project sustained by
such beliefs.194 Unfortunately, we find little evidence here. Perhaps
the professions have decided to keep their hands off compliance,
which can be an area in which one can get burnt when noncompliance is discovered.
According to one view, sociology cannot determine what is ethical.
The empirical and the normative should be kept separate.
Nonetheless, research such as undertaken here “may give us a
‘general orientation’ . . . in the light of which certain ways of looking
at ethics become more plausible than others.”195 If we had found
individuals acting in a role-differentiated way, then it becomes more
plausible to think of developing ethics in such a way. If we had found
the lawyer cast of mind in a strong sense, then it would make sense to
consider what the law of lawyering regarding compliance and
compliance systems should be. On the contrary, given our results, it
is more plausible to speak of professional ethics as only a species of
general ethics. The quality of the compliance manager and what she
accomplishes appears from our results to stem not from her
profession, but rather from her ethical character. This is not the
result Julius Henry Cohen would have imagined or desired. Yet he
has a comeback: these individuals have forsaken their profession for
business.
As we have argued, many, including Julius Henry Cohen, have
assumed that there is a lawyer cast of mind, without demonstrating its
existence. We hope our negative findings spur others to be explicit
about the parameters and consequences of socialization by legal
education and practice experiences. We hope our negative findings
193. DOROTHY EMMET, ROLES, RULES AND RELATIONS 158 (1966) (citing Talcott
Parsons); PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A SOCIOLOGICAL
INTERPRETATION 121 (1957). For a critical discussion of this tradition in the
commercial law context, see Christine Parker & Tanina Rostain, Law Firms, Global
Capital, and the Sociological Imagination, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2347 (2012).
A
194. MAGALI SAFRATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:
SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1997).
195. EMMET, supra note 193, at 4.
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spur lawyers who come to lead compliance programs to do more than
merely write manuals and lecture to employees, perhaps instead
leading the company to substantively value compliance with the law.

